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1. Introduction 
 
From the beginning of the 21st century and during its first decade the relations and 
cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan have 
reached a new level and moved from almost non-existent relations to an active 
cooperation in many fields.  
This paper is concerned with the period in the relations of these two countries 
when Dmitry Medvedev was the president of Russia and the time-period after his 
presidency. In order to be specific, we took the period from 2008 when Medvedev was 
elected president and covered the period including year 2013. Although this paper was 
written in the middle of 2014 we mostly limited the research to year 2013 in order to 
have conclusive statistical data for comparative analysis of different aspects of relations. 
This period of relations between the two countries is currently not researched 
thoroughly and the scholarly articles referring to it are limited, mostly small in size and 
covering a certain event of the period.  
The goal of this paper is to determine the characteristics of development of 
relations between Russia and Azerbaijan. To reach this goal we will provide the 
historical background of the relations between the two countries and use it as a tool for 
comparison to see how the relations have developed in the time-period concerned.  
This paper will attempt to answer the following research question: How have the 
Russian-Azerbaijani relations developed during and after Dmitry Medvedev’s 
presidential term? We will try to answer this question by looking at the development of 
relations between the two countries in various fields and by comparing these 
developments with existing historical relations before Medvedev’s term in office.  
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In order to achieve this goal, we will start the paper by exploring the existing 
literature about the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan and when available we will 
focus on the period that is answering our research question.  
After literature review, we will move onto providing the historical background to 
the relations between the two countries. In this chapter we will cover the period of the 
beginning of the 20th century and move to the period when Azerbaijan was in the Soviet 
Union and in that sub-chapter we will focus on the contribution Azerbaijan has made to 
the union and its relations with the centre of the union – Moscow. This chapter will also 
cover the period of the life of independent Azerbaijan after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  
The next chapter will be concerned with the diplomatic relations between the two 
countries and will provide the historical background of existing relations and devote 
most of the discussion to the period of Dmitry Medvedev’s term in office and how the 
diplomatic relations developed in this period.  
The following chapter will include the question of security cooperation and will 
be focused on the period of Medvedev’s term in office. In this chapter we will also 
discuss the question of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the Russian-Azerbaijani relations 
and observe if improvements have been made in this regard that benefit Azerbaijan.  
The chapter about economic relations will involve the developments in trade 
relations between the two countries, as well as cooperation in energy sector and tourism 
sector. In the sub-chapter covering the energy sector we will discuss how the Russian 
interests in this matter have influenced the diplomatic and overall relations between the 
two countries.  
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1.1 Literature Review 
 
It is difficult for Azerbaijan to pick a single political orientation, because a 
number of factors are in play and they make it tough for the country to choose one 
course of action. Most scholars agree that due to the complexity of the situation, 
Azerbaijan chose somewhat balanced foreign policy.1 
It is undebatable that world politics is governed by the interests of states. Each has 
its needs and requirements towards other countries, be it nearby or on the other part of 
the globe. Similar interests govern the relations between Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Azerbaijan. After the collapse of Soviet Union Azerbaijan became 
independent state and was facing more challenges that were of greater importance as 
compared to the condition when the country did not have to as a separate entity in the 
field of world politics because it was part of the Soviet Union.  
Almost the same way, Russia had to adjust its foreign policy after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union but unlike other smaller states included in the union Russia retained its 
imperialistic views and started meddling in the internal politics of newly emerged 
republics who had quite a lot on their plate as it was at the time. The interests of Russia 
to grab a hold and control its surrounding states does not surprise anybody because as 
one of the biggest countries in the world she had to secure its positions as a world leader 
from the very beginning.  
Much of the relations of Russia and Azerbaijan were based on this kind of 
interplay of interests from both sides. 
                                                          
Araz Aslanli, "Azerbaijan - Russia Relations: Is the Foreign Policy Strategy of Azerbaijan Changing?," Turkish Policy  
(2003).1 Fariz Ismailzade, "Azerbaijan’s Tough Foreign Policy Choices," UNISCI Discussion Papers, October 2004., 6 
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In order to better illustrate what we mean, we should take a closer look at what 
Azerbaijan has to offer to one of the major players in the world politics and what can 
Azerbaijan gain from having normalized relations with the aforementioned country.  
For Russia Azerbaijan is a state which occupies a strategically important region in 
the Caucasus2  and it plays a major role in Russia’s claims for global power because 
gaining control over Azerbaijan would mean that Turkey and Iran have little chance of 
closing on onto the borders of Russian Federation.3 Citing Alieva4, Freni states the 
following:  
“Azerbaijan is strategic not only for its status as a buffer zone 
between Moscow’s historic rivals, Turkey and Iran, but also for the 
Qabala Radar Station, the largest in the former Soviet Union, and its 
powerful industrial complex.5” 
Geography is not the only important part in this regard. It is clear that Russia uses 
energy as a tool for increasing political influence and this influence is spread on a strong 
entity such as European Union. Russia, with its own aspirations to become one of the 
main oil and gas producers in the world, has increasingly seen Azerbaijan as a 
competitor in the production of energy.6 Even though Russia sees Azerbaijan as a 
competitor, the governments of Russia have always understood that aggression would 
never work so they always try to make careful steps regarding political situation. They 
try to weaken Azerbaijan by supporting its Armenia, another actor in the south 
Caucasus and even though Russia has several other reasons to support Armenia, the 
                                                          
2 Aslanli, "Azerbaijan - Russia Relations: Is the Foreign Policy Strategy of Azerbaijan Changing?.", 138 
3 bid. 
4 Leila Alieva, "Reshaping Eurasia: Foreign Policy Strategies and Leadership Assets in Post‐Soviet South Caucasus," 
Berkely Program in Soviet and PostSoviet Studies  (2000)., 8 
5 Salvatore Freni, "Azerbaijan‐Russia Relations: An Analysis of Russian Hegemony," (2011)., 8 
6 Murat Gül, "Russia and Azerbaijan: Relations after 1989," Alternatives - Turkish Journal of International Relations 
7, no. 2 & 3 (2008)., 55 see Freni, "Azerbaijan‐Russia Relations: An Analysis of Russian Hegemony.", 9 
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weakening of Azerbaijan is one of them. Russia often takes steps to prevent any 
possibility of Azerbaijan becoming a source of energy for Europe.  
This opinion is supported by Araz Aslanli7, when he states that Russia attempts 
“To prevent or at least limit the alternative source of hydrocarbon supplies to key 
markets in order to increase dependence of customers on Russian energy supplies.” 
In addition to this, there are also security issues and Russia tries to limit the 
chance of USA or any other global player to establish military deployments in the 
Caucasus. Russia sees it as an important move to protect Russia’s coastal areas on the 
Caspian and Black seas.8 This has been proved many times recently when Russia made 
drastic moves in order to secure her positions on the Black Sea by occupying Crimea. 
They knew it would cause the international community to react very aggressively on 
this, but they still made this move because they see it as a guarantor of security if they 
take control of the seas bordering the country from south-west.  
“The psychological factor of history encouraged a special bond 
and the assumption that the republics would always seek close relations 
with the Kremlin. The need to preserve security derives from the issues 
of Russia’s own territorial integrity in the North Caucasus. The 
Caucasus, including both the North and South, can be seen as a region 
of security interdependency.”9 
By creating such “Controlled Instability” in the separatist regions all around its 
neighbourhood, Russia is attempting to create a control mechanism with which it will 
be controlling both sides of each conflict. It can be concluded from this, that it is in 
                                                          
7 Aslanli, "Azerbaijan - Russia Relations: Is the Foreign Policy Strategy of Azerbaijan Changing?.", 138 
 
8 Ibid. 
9 Kavus Abushov, "Policing the near Abroad: Russian Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus," Australian Journal of 
International Affairs  (2009)., 192 see Freni, "Azerbaijan‐Russia Relations: An Analysis of Russian Hegemony.", 8 
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Russia’s interests if these conflicts will remain active and not be resolved. By 
weakening the states and causing domestic instability, it forces their leaders to come to 
Russia asking for aid, allowing Moscow to create an environment that benefits its own 
interests.10 The conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh is similar to many others in the region 
and outside of it that as we have already mentioned Russia is “controlling”. Since 
Azerbaijan has witnessed a number of times that Russia often helps Armenia in its 
dispute over Nagorno-Karabakh with Azerbaijan, the governments of Azerbaijan have 
lead a careful policy towards Russia in order to get some of this favour. If it does not 
work and Azerbaijan does not get the support it seeks, then at least she will reduce the 
risks of having its enemy being financed by such great power like Russia.  
It is natural for a big country like Russia to have claims for being a global power 
and this is noticeable on the world arena of politics. As Araz Aslanli11 indicates, it is a 
psychological factor of the imperial past and [Russia] wants to become a global power. 
This unites all the interests of Russia that we have listed above and explains why it is 
spending so much effort in having good relations with Azerbaijan and also tries to gain 
control over it.  
Relations with Russia are determined by an interplay of two elements, which are 
the attempts by Moscow to keep its existing influence over Azerbaijan and second, the 
issue of Nagorno‐Karabakh conflict. Considering the common past in the Soviet Union, 
Azerbaijanis perceive Russia’s actions to be a little suspicious, because they see them as 
neo‐imperialist attempts to resurrect the Russian empire.12 Even though such risks are 
implied, Azerbaijan’s foreign policy is still direct towards normalizing relations with 
Russia, because a small country like this naturally can benefit from the global player 
                                                          
10 Alieva, "Reshaping Eurasia: Foreign Policy Strategies and Leadership Assets in Post‐Soviet South Caucasus." see 
Freni, "Azerbaijan‐Russia Relations: An Analysis of Russian Hegemony.", 8 
11 Aslanli, "Azerbaijan - Russia Relations: Is the Foreign Policy Strategy of Azerbaijan Changing?.", 138 
12 Freni, "Azerbaijan‐Russia Relations: An Analysis of Russian Hegemony.", 9 
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like Russian Federation. The main focus while conducting such foreign policy is for 
Azerbaijan to gain support in resolving a long-standing conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.  
Azerbaijan found itself in a web of complex international political game and its 
foreign policy depends on many aspects. As an energy producing country it has a lot to 
offer to the world in return but it does not have the luxury to offend any of the global 
players and that is why it has to choose more neutral foreign policy. 
Murat Gül13 supports this claim in his article “Russia and Azerbaijan: Relations 
after 1989”: 
“Russia’s interests in and its policies regarding the near abroad 
have been evolving. Developments in domestic politics and changes in 
the foreign policy goals of Russia have influenced Russia’s interests and 
policies with respect to Azerbaijan. Similarly, developments in the 
domestic politics and changes in the foreign policy preferences of 
Azerbaijan have greatly influenced relations between the two countries.” 
This can be considered the major determinant of the overall politics between 
Russia and Azerbaijan. It is also important to mention that Azerbaijan cannot shift its 
policy drastically as it is visible in the policies of its neighbouring countries Georgia 
and Armenia. While Georgia shifted its foreign policy towards EU and west and 
Armenia chose to ally with Russia, this is not a viable option for Azerbaijan, because it 
has much to gain from other global players as well. On the other hand EU is also 
interested in having good relations with Azerbaijan in order to gain energy 
independence from Russia and USA needs a place in the region to increase its military 
presence.  
                                                          
13 Gül, "Russia and Azerbaijan: Relations after 1989.", 54 
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“Russia has strategic interests in the North Caucasus in general: 
keeping the region in its sphere of influence, and avoiding the 
penetration into the region from other big powers, especially the United 
States. The sensitivity about this issue is related to Russia’s perceived 
global status and prestige.”14 
As it becomes clear from Gül’s remark, USA is not the only actor that is looking 
for positioning its military forces on this territory and Russia has similar interests too. If 
Russia will not manage to build military bases in Azerbaijan then their goal becomes to 
at least prevent USA from reaching this goal.  
We have said a lot about Russia’s military interests in Azerbaijan. This is mainly 
because Russia is a bigger force and they have major role in these relations. As national 
interest, Azerbaijan is also considering its security and the goal of the government is to 
ensure safety of its population. As we have mentioned above many times, Azerbaijan 
always takes careful steps in this regard, since the overall policy of the government is to 
balance the interests of global players and gain as much as possible from them. 
Balancing the foreign policy means giving their share of interests to other political 
actors and this turns into an exchange of services for mutual benefit.  
One more factor that influences the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan is 
the domestic political developments in Azerbaijan, along with the foreign policy 
preferences of the Azerbaijani governments. Inquiring about the political history of 
Republic of Azerbaijan and looking at the policy priorities of national governments and 
their debates over foreign policy issues, helps in showing Azerbaijan’s changing 
attributes toward its relation to the Russian Federation. While the nationalist 
                                                          
14 Ibid. 
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government of Elchibey rejected association with Russia, the more rationalist Aliyev 
pursued a balanced policy of collaboration with Russia.15 
When we look at the timeline of the Russian-Azerbaijani relations we see that 
after the collapse of Soviet Union Russia showed interest to gain economic control over 
Azerbaijan by trying to introduce Russian companies in oil and generally energy sector 
but it did not play out well for Russia. After taking power in 1992, the Azerbaijan 
Popular Front, led by Ebulfez Elchibey, the government was more concentrated on 
gaining independence. The beginning of Azerbaijan as independent state is well 
summarized in the following paragraph: 
“Elchibey officially visited Russia and numerous agreements between the two 
parties were signed, tensions continued. There was anti-Russia propaganda in 
Azerbaijan and no shares were allocated to Russian companies in petroleum 
agreements, which greatly disturbed Russia. Companies of Western origin became 
active in Azerbaijan and this ran contrary to the consolidation of Russian interests. 
Furthermore, during Elchibey’s rule, certain policies were adopted to discharge 
Russian troops from the region. As a consequence, a coup occurred in June 1993, and 
Elchibey was toppled.”16 
AS it becomes clear from Aslanli’s comments, the relations between Russia and 
Azerbaijan did not start well from the very beginning and it took a lot of work and 
cooperation to the following governments to normalize these relations.  
The reason why Elchibey’s government was strictly pro-western is that they took 
power after the first president of independent Azerbaijan Ayaz Mutallibov tried but did 
not succeed in gaining support from Russia, especially in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. Mutallibov even entered the country into the Commonwealth of Independent 
                                                          
15 Ibid., 55 
16 Aslanli, "Azerbaijan - Russia Relations: Is the Foreign Policy Strategy of Azerbaijan Changing?.", 139 
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States (CIS) in December of 1991, believing that it would aid the country’s position in 
the Nagorno‐Karabakh conflict.17 
Azerbaijan did not get the support they needed and politicians started to look at 
CIS with suspicion. This is why Elchibey’s government decided to withdraw from the 
commonwealth.  
Even though the country was trying to gain independence from the Kremlin, Baku 
and Moscow entered into a friendship treaty in October 1992. According to this treaty 
the countries were promising mutual assistance for either party in the case of foreign 
aggression.18 
Scholars agree that after Heydar Aliyev became president, the rhetoric from Baku 
became softer.19 By attempting to normalize relations with Russia, H. Aliyev tried to act 
more actively. In the summer of 1993, Aliyev, with the intention of ceasing Armenia’s 
invasion (with the assistance of Russia) of Azerbaijani territory, and reclaiming the 
occupied territories, visited Russia.20 Aliyev even tried to show his willingness to 
participate in CIS, which was later approved by the Azerbaijani Parliament.  
Even though such steps were taken, Azerbaijan did not get the support it 
expected. Though the tone of Heydar Aliyev’s speeches and acts reflected a pro-Russian 
attitude, Armenia’s occupation continued. Moreover, Azerbaijan lost a great chunk of 
its territory within the first six months of Aliyev’s Presidency.21 
                                                          
17 Freni, "Azerbaijan‐Russia Relations: An Analysis of Russian Hegemony.", 12 
18 Ibid. 
19 Aslanli, "Azerbaijan - Russia Relations: Is the Foreign Policy Strategy of Azerbaijan Changing?."; Freni, 
"Azerbaijan‐Russia Relations: An Analysis of Russian Hegemony."; Gül, "Russia and Azerbaijan: Relations after 
1989." 
20 Aslanli, "Azerbaijan - Russia Relations: Is the Foreign Policy Strategy of Azerbaijan Changing?.", 140 
21 Ibid. 
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It was not until late 1990s that Russia took actual steps towards normalizing 
relations with Azerbaijan. After a 3 year long economic embargo was finally lifted in 
1996.  
The first visit to Azerbaijan by a Russian president came on 9 January 2001 by 
President Putin. The two-day visit was planned to take place in 2000 but was delayed 
due to several reasons. However, a large delegation led by President Putin finally visited 
Baku on 9 January 2001.22 
There were several important agreements that were signed during that visit. These 
were the following: 
• The Status and Benefiting Principles of Gebele Radio Location 
Station (Gebele RLS, or in Russian Derial RLS); 
• Long term economic cooperation agreement between Russian 
Federation and Azerbaijan Republic until the year 2010; 
• The common declaration of the President of the Russian 
Federation, President Vladimir Vladimirovic Putin and President of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev.23 
Even though the relations seemed to normalize between the two countries, 
Azerbaijan was still unable to get the support it needed to resolve the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. Even after the presidents of both countries were changed nothing 
really changed policy-wise. Dmitry Medvedev became president of Russia and Ilham 
Alyiev the President of Azerbaijan, but scholars and researchers agree that the policies 
remained almost the same, the relations were somewhat peaceful and normal but there 
                                                          
22 Ibid., 141 
23 Ibid., 142 
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still remained occasional tensions between the two countries.24 The main issues were 
tension was most noticeable were energy agreements, espionage accusations, claims of 
Azerbaijani aid to Chechnya and actions against the Azerbaijan citizens residing in 
Russia.25  
As this paper is dedicated to discussing the period of Dmitry Medvedev’s 
presidency and the Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan during and after this period, we 
will discuss in a more detailed way the events that took place during this time a little 
later in this paper.  
We have to mention at this stage of our discussion that there is not abundance of 
materials on the period referred here, and much of the conclusions we will draw will be 
based on the raw statistical data and the events that took place during this period.  
 
1.2 Scope and Objective 
 
This thesis focuses on relations between Russian Federation and the Republic of 
Azerbaijan during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev in Russia in the years 2008 – 
2012 and also after his presidency to the nearest past. This paper will include as much 
of the recent activities in the field of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan as 
possible.  
In this paper we will try to draw a clear picture of the historical background on 
which the Russian-Azerbaijani relations are based. This will let us illustrate what has 
changed since the beginning of the relations and what was the situation when Dmitry 
                                                          
24 Ibid.; Freni, "Azerbaijan‐Russia Relations: An Analysis of Russian Hegemony." 
25 Aslanli, "Azerbaijan - Russia Relations: Is the Foreign Policy Strategy of Azerbaijan Changing?.", 143 
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Medvedev became president. It will also help us understand what was different before 
Medvedev’s term in office and what changed after his presidency.  
In the same way, we will try to draw a good picture of what kind of diplomatic 
relations were present in the separate and common past of Russia and Azerbaijan and 
try to understand if the diplomatic relations between these two countries were developed 
or not during Medvedev’s term in office.  
Quite big part of this paper will be dedicated to understanding if there were any 
considerable and successful steps taken towards cooperation in the field of security and 
if this affected the long-lasting conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. This thesis will cover the 
subject of the conflict and try to illustrate how the ongoing conflict affects the foreign 
policy of Azerbaijan. Based on the data and information provided about this conflict, we 
will try to analyse and make conclusions about what kind of benefits Azerbaijan 
received from Russia during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency if there were any such.  
Considering the fact that Russian-Azerbaijani relations did not start of well after 
Azerbaijan became an independent state, we will try to analyse if economic relations 
were advanced during Medvedev’s presidency and afterwards.  
In this regard, we will provide raw data about trade, construction, energy and 
tourism sectors and by comparing the data from the period of Medvedev’s presidency 
with the data of the earlier times we will be able to see if there have been any advances 
in the field of economic cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan.  
The overall objective of this thesis is to illustrate the changes that took place in 
Russian-Azerbaijani relations during and after Medvedev’s term in office as compared 
to the state of relations that the independent state of Azerbaijan had with Russia from 
the early 1990s until Medvedev became president. 
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1.3 Research Method 
 
For this thesis we will use a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research 
methods and we will provide facts from history as well as raw data from statistical 
departments of each country. Using this data we will be able to compare and draw 
conclusions on the changes that took place in the two different periods of recent history.  
As part of the research and data collection, library resources such as books and 
academic journals were used. Similarly, internet resources such as online journals, 
newspaper articles and different websites were used for data collection.  
In order to gather information and raw data on the development of economic 
cooperation between the two countries information was gathered from state entities that 
provide statistical data as well as from national and international trade organizations and 
business councils. 
The above mentioned information and data was collected and analysed to draw 
conclusions about the subject matter of this thesis.  
 
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is organized in six chapters covering all major aspects of cooperation 
that might exist between any two states and therefore it is relevant in this case as well. 
The first chapter is introductory part which includes a general introduction to the 
thesis. In addition to this, it includes quite extensive literature review that covers the 
17 
 
topics of cooperation and history of the two countries in consideration. It offers the 
current views of other scholars in terms of relations between Russian Federation and the 
Republic of Azerbaijan. It attempts to summarize what current trends are in the 
literature available on this topic and sets forth the general outline of the fields that are 
supposed to be discussed in this paper.  
The first chapter, the introductory part also includes outlining sub-chapters about 
the scope and objective of the paper as well as the structure of it. The scope and 
objective sub-chapter introduces the goals that are to be reached with the discussions 
introduced in this thesis and defines the frame in which these discussions will be led.  
The second chapter will be concerned mainly by providing a historical 
background to the topic under research which will be used both for comparison and the 
basis for the thesis. When we say comparison, we mean to have the historical 
background of the relations between two countries described so we have the ability to 
illustrate what has changed in the period of Medvedev’s term in office and afterwards.  
The chapter about historical background also aims at creating the basic picture of 
the beginning of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan. It will show how it started, 
how it developed and to what point it reached before Dmitry Medvedev became 
president.  
The third chapter describes the diplomatic relations of the two countries in 
question and much like the previous chapter it refers to the development of such 
relations throughout recent history as well as a little earlier such as the beginning of the 
20th century. The chapter also includes a massive period of time in the 20th century when 
Azerbaijan was part of Soviet Union and diplomatic relations could not have existed 
between the two countries at an official level due to obvious reasons but there were 
national interests on both sides notwithstanding the fact that they were in the same 
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union and this chapter deals with describing the situation back then. It could not have 
been ignored in the chapter describing diplomatic relations, just because it takes up 70 
years of history of the two countries and this period of time also created a basis of the 
relations that started on an official level after Azerbaijan gained independence from the 
Soviet Union.  
Most importantly, the third chapter refers to the period of time after Soviet Union 
collapsed and a lot of republics were created around modern day Russia. Azerbaijan was 
one of them and Russia’s foreign policy towards all of the newly emerged republics has 
been mostly the same. Azerbaijan was no exception and this chapter tries to illustrate 
how the diplomatic relations between the two countries started and how it continued 
until and after the period that is under the focus of this thesis.  
The fourth chapter deals with cooperation in the field of security which 
Azerbaijan has been trying to reach but with little success. Azerbaijan has always 
sought to cooperate in terms of security issues with Russia in order to balance the 
cooperation Armenia has from Russia. Based on the topic of ongoing conflict in 
Nagorno-Karabakh this chapter analyses the current situation in this region and tries to 
illustrate the level of military cooperation between the two countries.  
The fifth chapter is dedicated to outlining the ongoing cooperation between 
Azerbaijan and Russia in the field of economy. This is the field from which both 
countries get benefits and it is interesting to see if it has been developing over the course 
of recent history. The focus of the discussion will be the period of Medvedev’s term in 
office and the relations that existed prior to that, will be used as a tool for comparison to 
see if the relations developed or deteriorated.  
Considering the problems that existed in trade relations in the 1990s we consider 
it important to dedicate one sub-chapter to the topic of trade relations. It is our goal to 
19 
 
research this topic and see if time has brought changes and if the trade relations 
improved with Russia during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev and after that.  
The relations in energy sector are also of great importance because it has a lot of 
political implications that goes beyond the borders of the two countries and reaches out 
to the world politics. As a result of the balanced foreign policy that Azerbaijan is 
leading, the country has agreed to provide European Union with alternative energy 
source. This is not in the interests of Russia as it will lose the monopoly on the 
European energy market and it is strictly opposing the idea. So the sub-chapter about 
energy sector and Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia will be given due consideration in 
this thesis.  
In the field of economy, a separate discussion will address the topic of 
construction sector in Azerbaijan. Since there is a construction boom especially in the 
capital of Azerbaijan, Baku, it is of great interest to see if Russian state-owned or 
private companies are active in the field because owning property in another state can 
be determining big part of relations between countries 
Finally the chapter about economy will discuss the topic of tourism sector and 
will try to analyse if the changes in relations between Russia and Azerbaijan affect in 
any way the development of tourism sector. The topic will be focusing on the tourist 
flow between these two countries and the trends of its growth over time. This will help 
us understand if normalizing relations between Russia and Azerbaijan help grow the 
tourism industry and increase the flow of tourists between the two countries.  
The last chapter is a conclusion part were we summarize all the information 
discussed in the thesis and draw conclusions as to what has changed during Medvedev’s 
presidency and state the current tendency of development of relations between Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Azerbaija 
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2. Historical Background 
 
In this chapter we will look at the history of Azerbaijan in the beginning of the 
20th century which is the time when the national identity of Azerbaijan was formed. We 
will see what historical events took place that led to seeking independence from the 
Russian Empire.  
We will also examine what were the relations with the Russian empire during this 
time and how it continued after the World War I when Russian empire collapsed. We 
will discuss how the first Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was created and even though 
it did not last long it still became grounds for national awaking and the Republic that 
was founded a century later.  
The first sub-chapter: “Russian – Azerbaijani Relations in the Beginning of the 
20th Century” refers to the period of time prior to occupation by Soviet Union.  
The second sub-chapter: “The Role of Azerbaijan in the formation of the Soviet 
Union during Soviet Era” discusses the role that Azerbaijan played in the Soviet Union 
during the seven decades that Soviet Union existed. In this period Azerbaijan could not 
act as a separate political entity but it is still interesting to look at what was going on in 
the relations between Moscow and Baku.  
The third sub-chapter: “Russian – Azerbaijani Relations after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union” is the part which interests us most, because it refers to the period of time 
that is the major topic of discussion of this thesis. In this chapter we will discuss what 
events took place after the collapse of Soviet Union and how relations of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan developed with the Russian Federation. In this chapter we will also 
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describe basic outline of the historic events that took place during Dmitry Medvedev’s 
term in office which will serve as a background for our future detailed discussion of this 
period.  
 
 
2.1  Russian – Azerbaijani Relations in the Beginning of the 20th 
Century 
 
In 1813 the Treaty of Gulistan was signed between Russia and Qajar Persia. It 
was after necessary for Persia to sign it, because they were defeated by Russia. 
According to this treaty, Persia was acknowledging the loss of Dagestan, Georgia and 
most of Azerbaijan territory to Russia.26  
After a decade from this war, there was another Russo-Persian war in the years 
1826-28 which was again lost by Iran and it resulted in losing even more territories to 
Russia. Persia had to give up all their Caucasian territories in 1828 according to another 
treaty that benefited the victorious Russian Empire. This treaty by which Persia handed 
all of its Caucasian territories to Russia was called the Treaty of Turkmenchay. It was 
according to this treaty that most of Azerbaijani borders were defined.27  
Two provinces were established on the territory of modern day Azerbaijan: 
Elisavetpol (Ganja) in the west and Shamakha in the east. The tsars of Russian Empire 
were not paying a lot of attention to the newly occupied provinces and not much can be 
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said about relations between the rulers of Russian Empire and provinces which now 
constitute modern-day Azerbaijan.28  
The relations in all fields intensified when it was discovered how to use petroleum 
for providing energy in the 1870s and as a result of intensified migration from Russian 
Empire, Iran and many other places, the population of Baku increased from 10,000 to 
roughly 250,000 by 1900. Baku grew in size and prospered economically.29  
Although by the end of the 19th century a prolonged economic depression started, 
because oil boom was over and civil unrest in Baku became an ordinary matter. The 
workers were protesting against unemployment and hardship they had to live in. Due to 
this economic depression a lot of social and political changes took place in this period.30 
In this period The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDWP) was very 
active not only in Baku but throughout the whole region as well as entire Russia. The 
party split into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions in the year 1903. Both Bolsheviks 
and Mensheviks had powerful rivals in the independent labour movement and these 
were the Balakhany and Bibi-Eibat Workers Organization. This group was founded in 
1904 by brothers Lev and Ilya Shchendrikov and their primary goal was to help the 
local proletariat in their battle against hardship and unemployment.31  
The tensions broke out in a general strike in July 1903, and then in another one in 
December 1904. The 1904 strike was called by the Shchendrikovs and joined by the 
RSDWP and the Armenian organizations. This was the largest demonstration of unrest 
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among Baku workers to this date and ended in an impressive victory for them. As a 
result of these demonstrations the first labour contract was signed in Russia.32 
After the above mentioned protests took place, the Baku proletariat was called 
again to the streets for protesting and this time it was caused by the news of the 
massacre of the St. Petersburg workers on "Bloody Sunday," January 9, 1905. This was 
the date that marked the beginning of the Russian Revolution. As a result of this 
revolution the tsardom experienced great shock and it never recovered from the 
damages it suffered in the years 1905-1907.33 
Protest strikes and demonstrations against the massacre spread from Baku 
throughout Transcaucasia and it became impossible for the government to control it. In 
early February Baku was put under martial law. Then, in a major overhaul of the 
regional administration Tsar Nicholas II decreed the restoration of the viceroyalty of the 
Caucasus, entrusting this office to Count Illarion Ivanovich Vorontsov-Dashkov. He 
was charged with the mission "to establish without delay peace and order in the 
Caucasus.34  
In 1911, the Musavat Party was formed based on the ideology advocated by 
Mammed Amin Rasulzade. After the tsarist regime was overthrown in Russia the party 
expanded. In 1917, following the Russian Revolution the local population of Azerbaijan 
was granted rights to rule itself, but on the other hand, it also resulted in intensifying 
conflict between Azeri and Armenian ethnicities.35  
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Russian Empire collapsed in 1917 and an independent republic was proclaimed in 
Ganja on May 28, 1918. Prior to that an attempt to establish a federal Transcaucasian 
Republic with Armenia and Georgia failed.36  
Upon the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Federation the Muslim representation 
in the defunct Seim constituted itself into the Azerbaijani National Council and on May 
28, 1918 proclaimed that a new nation was born. The proclamation, which was to be 
referred to later on as the National Charter, read as follows: 
 1. Azerbaijan is a fully sovereign state; it consists of the southern 
and eastern parts of Transcaucasia under the authority of the Azerbaijani 
people. 
2. It is resolved that the form of government of the independent 
Azerbaijani state is a democratic republic. 
3. The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic is determined to establish 
friendly relations with all, especially with the neighbouring nations and 
states. 
4. The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic guarantees to all its citizens 
within its borders full civil and political rights, regardless of ethnic origin, 
religion, class, profession, or sex. 
5. The Azerbaijani Democratic Republic encourages the free 
development of all nationalities inhabiting its territory. 
6. Until the Azerbaijani Constituent Assembly is convened, the 
supreme authority over Azerbaijan is vested in a universally elected 
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National Council and the provisional government responsible to this 
Council.37 
This was the first Democratic Republic established in Islamic World. The first 
parliament of Azerbaijan opened on December 5, 1918. British administration initially 
did not recognize the Republic but still cooperated with it. By 1919 the situation in 
Azerbaijan was considerably stabilized and British forces left the country in August 
1919. By early 1920 Bolshevik forces won in Russian Civil War and they were 
becoming a growing threat to young republic, which also engaged in a conflict with 
Armenia over the Karabakh.38 
After this, with the help of Azeri dissidents in the Republican government, the 
Red Army invaded Azerbaijan on April 28, 1920. The Azeris did not surrender their 
brief independence of 1918–20 easily. 20,000 people died resisting the Russian Red 
Army. As the Bolshevik ideology was gaining support in Azerbaijan, it became even 
easier for the Red Army to successfully conquer the territory. The same day, on the 28th 
of April the Soviet government was formed under Nariman Narimanov.39  
This was the final chapter of Azerbaijan as a democratic republic and a new era 
started with the involuntary joining to the Soviet Union which lasted for about seven 
decades. As part of Soviet Union Azerbaijan could not act as a separate political entity 
but it is interesting to look at its role in the union. It is important to see how Russia 
influenced the country in all fields and what it gained and what it lost from this 
cooperation.  
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2.2  The Role of Azerbaijan in the formation of the Soviet Union 
during Soviet Era 
 
As we have mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, the Azerbaijan SSR was 
established on the 28th of April, 1920. It was and end of Azerbaijan Democratic 
Republic and a beginning of Azerbaijan SSR inside the Soviet Union. Establishment of 
Azerbaijan SSR happened after the government surrendered to local Bolsheviks led by 
Mirza Davud and Nariman Narimanov as well as to the invasion of Bolshevik 11th Red 
Army.40  
On the 13th of October, 1921, the Soviet Republics of Russia, Georgia, Armenia 
and Azerbaijan signed an agreement with Turkey. This agreement is known by the name 
of Treaty of Kars, according to which previously independent Nakhchivan SSR became 
an autonomous ASSR within Azerbaijan.41  
From the very beginning of Soviet Union, Transcaucasian Socialist Federative 
Soviet Republic (TSFSR) was created which included Azerbaijan, Armenia and 
Georgia. It existed as a single Republic included in the Soviet Union and lasted for 
about 14 years and was later dismantled because the leaders were finding it difficult to 
agree on certain issues. After it being dismantled, each country became republic of the 
Soviet Union directly.42  
The main focus of the Soviet government seating in Moscow was to utilize the 
Azerbaijani oil fields. In 1921, in order to help the Azeri oil industry, the Supreme 
Council of the National Economy put Azerbaijan’s needs ahead of other states’ needs 
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and provided it with everything necessary to make Azeri oil industry profitable as soon 
as possible. As a result of these efforts new oilfields were discovered.43  
After investing in Azerbaijani oil fields, the industry started to grow and within 10 
years, the oil industry of Azerbaijan SSR was supplying over 60% of the total Soviet oil 
production.  
In order to fully understand the role of Azerbaijan in the economy of the Soviet 
Union from the very beginning, it is enough to state the fact that at the end of the second 
five-year plan (1933–1937) Azerbaijan appeared at 3rd place in the Soviet Union by its 
capital investment size.44 
The capacity of oil production in Baku played an important role in the life of 
Soviet Union especially during the World War II. After Germany attacked previously its 
ally, Soviet Union, Baku became one of the major targets for Germany. Before that, 
when Soviet Union was still an ally of the Nazi Germany during the years 1939-1941, 
France and Great Britain were considering to bomb Azeri oil fields to weaken their 
common enemy, but this was never utilized.45  
During the World War II, in the first year of Soviet-German war, Azerbaijan 
produced a record-high amount of oil – 25.4 million tons. This was made possible, 
because the workers on oil fields volunteered to work extra hours and without vacation 
during the war. This was a huge support to the Soviet Union in terms of energy it 
needed to fight off the invading army of Germany.46  
For a brief moment, it seemed possible and there was a chance to unite Iranian 
Azerbaijan with the Soviet Azerbaijan. After the Soviet occupation of the Iranian 
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Azerbaijan in the summer of 1941 Pan-Azerbaijani nationalism was revived in a way. 
During the Soviet occupation Azerbaijani literary language was being promoted in these 
regions. Soviet government was supporting this idea and in 1945 an autonomous 
“Azerbaijan People’s Government” was set up at Tabriz under Jafar Pishevari, the 
leader of the Azerbaijani Democratic Party. With these events taking place, the chance 
of uniting the two sides of Azerbaijan became more realistic and possible, but it soon 
turned into one of the first conflicts of the Cold War and after the pressure from the 
West the Soviet Army was withdrawn.47  
In terms of development of Azerbaijan and relations with Moscow, real changes 
took place after the World War II. After the 1950s, policies of de-Stalinization and 
improvement were being implemented which led to better education and welfare 
conditions for most of Azerbaijan.  
Alongside this, it was a period of rapid urbanization and industrialization. During 
this period of change, a new anti-Islamic drive and return to a policy of Russification, 
under the policy of sblizheniye (reapprochment), was instituted. This was an attempt to 
merge all the peoples of the USSR into a new and unified Soviet nation.48 
In the 1960s, the oil fields of Azerbaijan were losing their importance and 
position in the economy of Soviet Union. The reason for this was that all the oil 
resources that were on land were already used and there were not cost-efficient ways of 
extracting oil from the sea. As a result of this change, Azerbaijan had one of the lowest 
rate of growth in economic output in Soviet republics.49  
In order to resolve these economic issues, the government in Moscow appointed 
Heidar Aliyev as the first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan in 1969. 
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Aliyev managed to temporarily improve economic conditions of the country mainly by 
promoting alternative industries to the declining oil industry, such as cotton.50  
He also directly influenced the republic's ruling elite and after the changes he 
made it consisted mainly of ethnic Azerbaijanis. In 1982 Aliyev was made a member of 
the Communist Party's Politburo in Moscow. In 1987, when Perestroika started, Soviet 
leader Mikhail Gorbachev forced him to retire, because he was opposing his reform 
policies.51  
In the late 1980s the unrest was increasing in the Caucasus. In this case, we are 
referring to the disputes over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. 
During this period, national ideology was gaining more and more importance 
among the population of Azerbaijan as well as in other parts of Soviet Union and 
Communist Party was losing its image as a guarantor of national rights for all. As a 
result of this change, independent political organizations began to emerge, out of which 
the most popular in Azerbaijan was the Popular Front of Azerbaijan (PFA). This party 
already gained enough support to be able to take power from the Communist Party, but 
was soon split in two between conservative-Islamic wing and a moderate wing. After 
these internal disagreements, the anti-Armenian violence started in Baku and it was 
soon followed by intervention by Soviet troops.52  
In the attempt to restore order in Baku, the Red Army killed at least 132 
demonstrators on the 20th January 1990. Following these events, Azerbaijan adopted its 
declaration of independence on the 30th of August, 1991. Soon after this, the Soviet 
Union was dismantled on the 25th of December 1991. After these events, the state of 
                                                          
50 Prezident Kitabxanası. 
51 Library of Congress Country Studies. 
52 Ibid. 
30 
 
Azerbaijan SSR formally ceased to exist on the 12th of November 1995. The basis for 
this was the adoption of the new constitution by popular referendum.53  
By this time Azerbaijan was part of the Commonwealth of Independent States and 
the relations with the Russian Federation had entered a new stage of development.  
We will discuss these developments more thoroughly in the next chapter that 
deals with the period after the Soviet Union collapsed.  
 
2.3  Russian – Azerbaijani Relations after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union 
 
After the Soviet Union collapsed, parties and political figures became more active 
in Azerbaijan. Mutallibov and his supporters had the same demands for independence as 
did the Azerbaijani Popular Front, but they still remained each other’s political 
opponents. In 1991, Mutallibov was elected president, but APF claimed that election 
process was corrupt. Azerbaijani nationalists were opposing all links with Russia and 
Armenia, but Mutallibov still entered the country in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States. However after a year the country left CIS and remained an observer, but it 
resumed full membership in late 1993.54 This shows that Russian Federation was 
attempting not to lose ties with former Soviet republics and managed to retain political 
control over Azerbaijan through CIS.  
In 1993, Abulfaz Elchibey won five-candidate electoral contest but he served as a 
president for only one year. He was forced to flee Baku in mid-June 1993. Heydar 
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Aliyev took advantage of the chaos and took power and an election in 1993 confirmed 
him as president.55  
From the beginning of his presidency Aliyev was trying to improve relations with 
Russia and Iran which resulted in cooling the relations with Turkey. Aliyev’s goal was 
to gain support of Russia to aid the country in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but 
Russia was involved in direct negotiations with Armenia and Azerbaijan was not very 
successful in gaining their support.56  
The Federal Research Division summarizes Aliyev’s aspirations and the interest 
in normalizing relations with Russia in the following chapter: 
In messages and interviews early in his administration, Aliyev 
asserted that his new government would not alter Azerbaijan's domestic 
and foreign policies, and that his country would seek good relations with 
all countries, especially its neighbors, including Russia. He criticized the 
uneven relations that existed between Azerbaijan and Russia during the 
Elchibey regime. At the same time, Aliyev stressed that he viewed 
Azerbaijan as an independent state that should never again be 
“someone's vassal or colony”.57 
However, the presence of Russian forces in Azerbaijan became problematic for 
the country when Russian troops were alleged to have assisted Armenians in an attack 
that killed hundreds of civilians in the town of Khodzhaly in February 1992. Following 
these events components of a 62,000-member Russian force began to withdraw from 
Azerbaijan.  
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Since Azerbaijan gained independence from Soviet Union the country started to 
pursue its own policies in all the fields and a lot of events took place in the last two 
decades. It would take us a lot farther from our topic if we discuss all of them here, so 
we will try to summarize all the events in a broader picture.  
Anar Valiyev divides the last two decades of independent Azerbaijan in three 
major parts.  
The first stage of relations with Russia covers the period of Boris Yeltsin’s 
presidency when relations between the two countries were close to hostile and the 
reasons for this were different. There were a lot of issues on which Russia was losing 
control in the region and on the other hand Azerbaijan was not satisfied with Russia’s 
open support to Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia’s goal was mostly 
to satisfy their interests but had little to offer to Azerbaijan and because of this relations 
between the two countries during this period cannot be characterized positively. Russia 
was pressuring Azerbaijani government to join the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization and stop any possible cooperation with NATO. It was also not in Russia’s 
interest for Azerbaijan to carry out any energy project that could compete with Russian 
dominance on European energy market and it took Azerbaijan great effort to build 
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline in order to secure access to Western energy markets.58  
The second stage of the two-decade period lasted from 2000 to 2008 and includes 
Vladimir Putin’s two terms of presidency. In this period Russian government realized 
that their aggressive and disruptive policies were giving them little success in relations 
with Azerbaijan so they quickly switched to softer approach.59 On the other hand, whilst 
the first two presidents of post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Abdulfaz Elcebey and Heidar Aliyev, 
tried to create a distance between their country and Russia, the current president, Ilham 
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Aliyev has staked a lot on building a good personal rapport with the Russian 
leadership, and between the two states.60 Putin’s administration managed to secure 
Azerbaijan’s support in the second Chechen war. In addition to this, economic ties grew 
and political interests lost their importance. Russian business elite started investing in 
Azerbaijan which increased the above mentioned economic ties. During this period 
Putin managed to find common ground with former president Heydar Aliyev and 
current president Ilham Aliyev which contributed to more active cooperation in various 
fields. The Azerbaijani public started to see Russia as an unbiased side in resolving 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and if before Russia was seen as an active supporter of 
Armenia, now trust towards Russia increased in public due to the meetings, presidential 
visits to Azerbaijan and active cooperation in different fields. Due to increased 
cooperation on both political and business levels, Russia was becoming a desirable 
strategic partner in the public eye.61  
The shaping of the image of Russia in the public eye of Azerbaijan started 
deteriorating with the end of the Georgia-Russian Five-Day war and recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It was shocking for the Azerbaijani public to see acts of 
aggression against its neighbouring independent country and all the events that took 
place in that period played a very negative role in shaping the image of Russia in 
Azerbaijan. These events were the beginning of the third stage of relations between 
Russia and Azerbaijan during the past two-decade period. Although there was no direct 
action against Azerbaijan and Russia started to improve relations with frequent visits of 
officials to Azerbaijan, the “fear” of Russia re-emerged in the country.62 
The above are the three main stages of relations between the Russian Federation 
and the Republic of Azerbaijan since its independence. In the next chapters we will be 
                                                          
60 "Commonspace.Eu,"  in To what extent have Azerbaijan's relations with Russia deteriorated? (2013). 
61 "Azerbaijan-Russia Relations after the Five-Day War: Friendship, Enmity, or Pragmatism?." 
62 Ibid. 
34 
 
discussing the period of Medvedev’s term in office and how relations developed in this 
period. This chapter will serve as a background to the developing events and will help 
us illustrate where the relations started and at what stage they are now.  
 
 
 
3. Diplomatic relations between Russia and Azerbaijan 
 
3.1 Overview of Russian – Azerbaijani Relations before Dmitry 
Medvedev’s Term in Office 
 
After Azerbaijan became an independent state it started establishing diplomatic 
relations with other countries. Among them was Russian Federation.  
On the 4th of April, 1992 Republic of Azerbaijan and Russian Federation 
established diplomatic relations.63 This was a step forward in the relations between the 
two countries since Mutallibov’s foreign policy was strictly anti-Russian.  
In the same year, on the 12th of October, president of Azerbaijan Abulfaz 
Elchibey signed agreement on friendship, cooperation and mutual security with Boris 
Yeltzin, who was the president of Russian Federation at that time.64  
In this period there were a lot of changes in the political life of Azerbaijan and no 
notable steps were undertaken towards improving the diplomatic relations with Russia, 
because there were major political battles going on. This period is not characterized 
with special activity in this direction. 
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When Heydar Aliyev became president, he was determined to improve relations 
with Russia and after almost one year of his presidency, on the 17th of November 1994 
he paid a working visit to Moscow and met with President Boris Yeltzin.65  
On the 3rd of July, 1997 Heydar Aliyev paid an official visit to Russia. During this 
visit an agreement on friendship, cooperation and security was signed.  
After a break of 3 years, the meetings between the presidents of the two countries 
started again and on the 24th of January 2000, Heydar Aliyev and Vladimir Putin had an 
unofficial meeting Moscow.66 
Beginning with this meeting, the relations between the two countries intensified 
and there were a lot of high-level meetings held since then. The chronology of the 
meetings of Presidents, Heads of Governments, Heads of Parliaments and Ministers can 
be seen in the Annex I of this thesis. The source of the information is the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan.  
Russian president Vladimir Putin paid his first official visit to Baku on January 9, 
2001. This was a fruitful visit in terms of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan, 
because a lot of agreements were signed during the visit. These agreements were as 
follows: 
1. Agreements on international auto communication;  
2. On cooperation and mutual assistance in observation of tax law;  
3. On cooperation in the field of prevention and solving the emergency 
situations;  
4. On the status of Russian media correspondents in Azerbaijan and Azeri media 
correspondents in Russia;  
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5. On cooperation in the field of governmental communication;  
6. Agreement on information security;  
7. Baku Declaration on relations between Russia and Azerbaijan;  
8. Joint statement on the principles of cooperation in the Caspian Sea.67 
The following year was also very fruitful in the relations of Azerbaijan and 
Russia. This becomes obvious when we look at the visit that Heydar Aliyev paid to 
Moscow on the 24th of January, 2002. During this visit a number of agreements were 
signed as well, which shows that the relations between the two countries were starting 
to warm especially after Boris Yeltzin was replaced by Vladimir Putin. These are the 
agreements that were signed during the visit of the president of Azerbaijan to Russia: 
1. A political declaration, an agreement on long-term economic cooperation till 
2010;  
2. Intergovernmental agreements on the main principles and directions of 
economic cooperation;  
3. On cooperation in the field of information exchange;  
4. On prevention of violation of tax law;  
5. On cooperation in the field of production;  
6. On the status, principles and conditions of the usage of Gabala radiolocation 
station.68 
During the period of Vladimir Putin’s presidency, among many official visits 
there were unofficial ones as well. For example, on June 8-9, 2002, President Heydar 
Aliyev paid a working visit to St, Petersburg where he met with his counterpart 
President Vladimir Putin.69 
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In the same year, on September 23-24 President Heydar Aliyev paid yet another 
working visit to Russia during which 4 documents were signed.  
Another important visit of President Vladimir Putin to Baku was on the 15th of 
December 2003, when he visited Azerbaijan with a delegation of 100 people. This was 
not a working visit that had to do anything with the negotiations or signing of 
agreements, but this was a visit to pay their respects to the national leader of Azerbaijan, 
Heydar Aliyev and attend his funeral.70 
The president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev continued the foreign policy of his 
predecessor towards Russia. On the 6th of February, 2004, Ilham Aliyev paid an official 
visit to Moscow and affirmed his aspirations to retain close relations with Russia.  
During this visit the following agreements were signed: 
1. The Moscow Declaration;  
2. Cooperation agreement on prevention of smuggling and violation of tax 
regulations;  
3. Program of cooperation in the humanitarian field from 2004 to 2006;  
4. Protocol of agreement on free trade between Russia and Azerbaijan  
5. An agreement on cooperation between ITAR-TACC and Azeri state news 
agency AzerTaj.71 
The political course of Azerbaijan in relation to Russia continued with the new 
president of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev. In addition to the above mentioned visit, in the 
year 2004, Ilham Aliyev visited Russia on two separate occasions to meet with his 
counterpart. These two visits were working visits, which took place on the 3rd of July in 
the first case and on 18-19 of October in the next case.72 The frequent visits of the 
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President of Azerbaijan to Russia from the early stage of his presidency reaffirmed the 
willingness of Baku to continue warm diplomatic relations with Moscow.  
After improving cooperation with Russia in so many different fields, Russia 
seemed more interested to deepen the ties with Azerbaijan and the year 2005 was the 
year of Azerbaijan in Russia. On the 16th of February President Ilham Aliyev paid a 
working visit to Moscow to attend the ceremony of opening the year of Azerbaijan in 
Russia.  
After several months from the above mentioned visit, on the 9th of May, President 
Ilham Aliyev paid another working visit to Russia to attend a ceremony which marked 
the 60th anniversary of the Victory in the Great Patriotic War.73 The early period of 
Ilham Aliyev’s presidency is characterized with frequent visits to Russia that stresses 
the interest of Azerbaijan in maintaining good diplomatic relations with Russia as well 
as good relations in other spheres of cooperation. Compared to Vladimir Putin’s rare 
visits to Azerbaijan in this period, we can say that although Russia remained open to 
maintaining good relations with Russia, the lack of official visits to Azerbaijan 
emphasizes that Azerbaijan was more active in deepening the relations with Russia than 
the other way around. 
Later in the same year, in June, Ilham Aliyev again visited Russia and met with 
Vladimir Putin within the framework of 9th international economic forum that was held 
in St. Petersburg.74  
That same summer, on the 30th of August, Ilham Aliyev paid yet another working 
visit to Russia and attended the 1000th anniversary of Kazan.75 
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It was only after these numerous visits of Ilham Aliyev to Russia that in 2006 
Vladimir Putin paid a working visit to Azerbaijan.76 During this visit, Vladimir Putin 
took part in the opening ceremony of the Year of Russia.  
On the 16th of June, 2006 a meeting was held between Aliyev and Putin in Alma-
Ata, where they also participated together in the "Conference on Interaction and 
Confidence Building Measures in Asia".77 
The year 2006 saw many official and working visits which was also noticeable in 
previous years. This same year, on the 21-22 July, Ilham Aliyev attended an informal 
summit of CIS held in Moscow and later on the 8-11 of November Ilham Aliyev paid 
another working visit to Moscow. This year was finalized with another important 
official visit of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, who visited Baku on the 4th of 
December to attend the closing ceremony of the Year of Russia in Azerbaijan. During 
this visit, a programme of Cooperation in the Humanitarian Sphere for 2007-2009 was 
adopted by the two countries.78  
The next year, 2007, like the previous year, is also characterized with a lot of 
visits from the Azerbaijani side to Russia. The first visit was on the 27-28th of March, 
which was a little different from the previous working and official visits. This was more 
a cultural visit than a diplomatic one. Ilham Aliyev visited Moscow with his spouse 
Mehriban Aliyeva during which they attended an official reception organized by 
Vladimi Putin in the Kremlin Palace in honour of the musician and conductor Maestro 
Mstislav Rostropovich for his great contribution to the development of international 
cultural relations and music of Azerbaijan, the hero of the day was awarded the Order of 
Heydar Aliyev. After this event, there was a meeting held between the two presidents on 
which satisfaction with the development of relations between Russia and Azerbaijan 
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and mentioned that the frequent high-level meetings had special importance in 
extending this cooperation.79  
On the 25th of April, 2007, Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, A. Rasi-Zadeh paid a 
visit to Moscow on behalf of the President of Azerbaijan to attend the funeral of first 
Russian Prezident Boris Yeltsin. During this visit he met with President Vladimir 
Putin.80 
Later that same year, a month after his 80th anniversary, Maestro Mstislav 
Rostropovich passed away and Ilham Aliyev visited Moscow to attend the funeral. In 
the year 2007, Ilham Aliyev paid two more visits to Moscow. On the first occasion, on 
the 9-10th of June, he attended an informal meeting of the CIS member states and later 
the same month, on the 30th of June, Vladimir Putin invited Ilham Aliyev to Rostov-on-
Don to watch the races for the “Prize of the President of Russia”.81  
The last visit of President Ilham Aliyev to Russia, during the presidential term of 
Vladimir Putin was on the 20-24th of February in 2008. During this visit he took part in 
an informal summit of the CIS member states. It was also during this visit that Ilham 
Aliyev was awarded the title of Honorary Professor of Moscow State University.82 
The frequent visits listed above shows that relations between Russia and 
Azerbaijan improved considerably since the beginning of the 21st century, because 
during the previous decade, in the 1990s the relations were mostly friendly but meetings 
on high-level were seldom held.  
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3.2  Russian – Azerbaijani Relations during and after Dmitry 
Medvedev’s Term in Office 
 
The active cooperation between Russian and Azerbaijani governments that 
existed during the two presidential terms of Vladimir Putin in Russia continued when 
Dmitry Medvedev started his presidential term.  
On the 3rd of July, 2008 Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited Azerbaijan 
and met with President Ilham Aliyev. During this visit the two presidents signed a 
number of agreements on cooperation in the field of economy. The following is the list 
of some of the documents that were signed during this visit: 
1. Baku Declaration on friendship and strategic partnership;  
2. Agreement on cooperation between foreign ministries of two countries in 
working with the archives in two countries;  
3. Memorandum between foreign ministries of two countries on cooperation in 
the field of protection of transit cargoes;  
4. Agreement on cooperation between customs offices in the field of prevention of 
customs violations;  
5. Memorandum of cooperation between Russian and Azeri State Property 
Committees.83 
After the Russo-Georgian war in August of 2008 and especially after Russia’s 
recognition of the separatist regions of Georgia, Azerbaijan’s concerns grew as they saw 
the threat that Russia could recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as well.  
Shortly after the war, on the 16th of September 2008 President of Azerbaijan 
Ilham Aliyev paid a working visit to Moscow to discuss with Dmitry Medvedev the 
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changes that the August War brought. The discussions were held behind the closed 
doors and it is hard to guess what was discussed there. The only information that was 
brought to public was given out through public statements. The speeches of the two 
presidents were quite standard with the exception that Medvedev reaffirmed Russia’s 
position on Nagorno-Karabakh. He stated that Russia’s position towards the region had 
not changed.84  
In year 2009, Gazprom signed an agreement with Azerbaijan for buying natural 
gas.85 Signing of this document was not merely an economic step from Russia but a 
political one too, considering the fact that Russia herself is a provider of huge sources of 
natural gas and the amount they promised to import from Azerbaijan is not so big. It is 
more of a political will to have a certain influence on economic sector of Azerbaijan and 
demonstrate its will to be partners with Azerbaijan not only by speeches but by actual 
active steps as well.  
The point of the deal being not only an economical one, can be proven with the 
fact that during Medvedev’s working visit to Azerbaijan also involved discussions of 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia has pledged to Azerbaijan to do everything in its 
power to resolve the conflict. In the article, dated July 1, 2009, it is cited from the 
speech of the head of the Russian State, "Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can be resolved in 
a fairly close historical perspective, and Russia will do everything for this".86 
As we have mentioned above, the meetings and discussions over the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict have been active during the past several years and Azerbaijan 
received more favourable attitude from Russia than before. The meetings with the 
president of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan continued in year 2009 but yielded little result in 
terms of actual resolution of the conflict or taking any active steps towards it. 
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 During the visit there were certain other documents that were signed, among 
them were: 
1. The Baku Declaration on Friendship and Strategic Partnership; 
2. The cooperation agreement in the field of archives between the 
two countries’ Ministries of Internal Affairs; 
3. The memorandum on protection of transit cargoes between the 
two countries’ Ministries of Internal Affairs; 
4. The cooperation agreement to prevent customs offences between 
the two countries’ customs; 
5. The memorandum on cooperation between the Russian and 
Azerbaijan State Property Committees.87 
By this time the two countries had already signed about 110 inter-state, 
intergovernmental and inter-regional agreements. 
But notwithstanding the fact that several quite important documents were signed 
during this visit, the deal that has been made on importing gas from Azerbaijan is by far 
the most important achievement not only during the visit, but during the past several 
years as well. This is mainly because by signing an agreement with Russia on providing 
the fuel, Baku guarantees a sale of gas and diversification of energy supply regardless of 
the fate of European gas pipelines. Even if  NABUCCO, TAP, and Poseidon projects 
are successfully implemented by Western investors, the benefits of Baku from the 
contract with Gazprom are evident: thanks to the long-term arrangements Azerbaijan 
will be able to reasonably negotiate with the EU on the most favourable conditions for a 
gas supply via route that bypasses Russia. Thus, any co-operation between Moscow and 
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Baku is in favour of Azerbaijan. The warm relations between Russia and the strongest 
in the Caucasus country should yield many benefits to both parties.88 
On the 25th of January, 2010, in Sochi the President of the Republic of Armenia 
Serzh Sargsyan, the President of the Russian Federation Dmitri Medvedev and the 
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev held a tripartite meeting on the resolution of the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict. In the first half of the meeting the heads of governments 
held talks on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the second half of the meeting was 
conducted with the participation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the three states. 
During this meeting that was held at the Sochi residence of the Russian President, there 
were discussed the issues related to the current stage of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace 
process and its possible future development. Later, the Presidents of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation continued discussions during the informal 
dinner.89 
As it becomes obvious from yet another meeting, the parties are trying to 
normalize the situation in the region, but it does not have any actual consequences. It 
never goes beyond talks and the results are not as visible as public would expect. But 
the one thing that is comparatively a success for Azerbaijan’s diplomatic policy is that 
Russia’s attitude towards Azerbaijan is warmer compared to what it used to be and 
taking into consideration that Russia has always and almost openly been supporting 
Armenia in the mentioned conflict.  
At this meeting, the two presidents (of Azerbaijan and Armenia) reportedly 
reached agreement on the final wording to the preamble of a revised version of the 
"principles." The mentioned preamble reaffirms their shared commitment to resolve the 
conflict peacefully, within the framework of international law. However, progress in 
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this regard has been hindered, by Turkey's insistence on linking ratification of the two 
protocols signed in Geneva previous October on normalizing Armenian-Turkish 
relations to concessions by Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process, 
specifically the liberation of at least some of the seven districts of surrounding the 
unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh republic that are currently under Armenian control.90 
As a follow up to this meeting, there was another one held on June 17 the same 
year. As Radio Free Europe reports Russian President Dmitry Medvedev met on the 
side-lines of the St. Petersburg Economic Forum with the presidents of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan to discuss the ongoing search for a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict.  
This meeting was the sixth in a series of such trilateral meetings since Medvedev's 
inauguration as president in May 2008. According to a statement issued by Medvedev's 
office after the three-hour talks, the two sides made progress towards narrowing their 
differences on unspecified contentious issues.91 
It can also be considered a success of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy that after this 
meeting there have been discussions on implementing a so called “Madrid Principle” 
that stated that Armenia would withdraw its forces from the Azerbaijani territory 
between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. It is highlighted in the article dated June 18, 
2010 on the website of Radio Free Europe in the following way: 
The most recent variant of the so-called "Madrid Principles" 
reportedly envisaged a phased Armenian withdrawal from five of the 
seven Azerbaijani districts currently controlled by Armenian forces 
(Agdam, Fizuli, Jabrayil, Zangelan and Qubadli), but does not specify 
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over what timeframe and in what order. It advocates "special 
modalities" for the Lachin corridor that links Nagorno-Karabakh and 
the Republic of Armenia, and the district of Kelbacar sandwiched 
between Karabakh and Armenia.92 
However, the timeframe had not been agreed upon as to when Armenia would 
withdraw its forces from this territory and it complicated the matter. Since mid-April of 
year 2010, Azerbaijani politicians were floating various proposals concerning the 
timeframe for the anticipated Armenian withdrawal. Azerbaijani parliamentarian Tahir 
Rzayev was quoted by day.az as saying that ideally Armenia should withdraw from the 
five districts simultaneously. He said such a withdrawal is of "strategic importance" for 
Azerbaijan. At the same time, he intimated that Baku would accept as a compromise the 
2+3+2 model (meaning Agdam and Fizuli; then Jabrayil, Zangelan and Qubadli; then 
Lachin and Kelbacar). 
Yet another meeting was held between the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Russia and 
Armenia in Astrakhan on the 27th of October 2010.93 After the meeting Russian 
President, Dmitry Medvedev, expressed “moderate” optimism about a near-term 
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The talks held underscored Moscow’s key 
role in the Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiating process, which appears to have become 
more pronounced in recent months.94 
Previous meetings have been important to set the grounds for the diplomatic 
resolution of the conflict, but this meeting was of particular importance as in a joint 
statement with Medvedev signed after the meeting, the Presidents of Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, Serzh Sargsyan and Ilham Aliyev reaffirmed their stated commitment to a 
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“political-diplomatic” settlement of the conflict and pledged to reinforce the ceasefire 
regime in the conflict zone. Sargsyan and Aliyev said that for that purpose they agreed 
to expedite, “without delay,” an exchange of prisoners of war and the bodies of soldiers 
killed in recent skirmishes.95 
Later the same year, on the 10th of December president of Azerbaijan paid a 
working visit to Moscow, Russia, where meeting of the CIS Council of Heads of State 
took place. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev attended the meeting.96 
This was the last visit in the year 2010 and there was a kind of break in the 
meetings throughout the next several months until 24th of June, 2011. A joint meeting of 
President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, President of the Russian 
Federation Dmitriy Medvedev and President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh 
Sargsyan was held at the Kazan Kremlin. President of the Russian Federation Dmitry 
Medvedev met President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev outside the Kazan 
Kremlin. During the meeting, the sides discussed issues relating to the settlement of the 
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.97 
As we look at the chronology of these meetings, it becomes noticeable that during 
the presidential term of Medvedev, the number of such meetings increased and with 
each next meeting, there were more certain goals reached. It is particularly noteworthy 
that compared to previous years, and even the previous decade, Azerbaijan managed to 
gain more support from the Russian government and the country became more involved 
with Russia economically as well.  
In the beginning of July, a proposal on the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks drafted 
by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was presented to the governments of 
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Azerbaijan and Armenia. Later that same year Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar 
Mammadyarov presented his president’s response to the Russian Foreign Minister 
Sergei Lavrov when he travelled to the region. The news article on asbarez.com on July 
18, 2011 referred to the speech of Mammadyarov: “not everything depends on 
Azerbaijan. We have to wait for Armenia’s response to the same proposals, but we think 
there is progress in the talks, and we are gradually moving to the line, where everyone 
will come to understand that no one benefits from the status quo.” In the same article, a 
quote from the speech of Sergei Lavrov was used: “The Nagorno-Karabakh resolution 
is a priority issue for Russia. The project of Basic Principles starts from the willingness 
of the parties to work on the peace treaty. We continue our efforts in the context of 
relations with both parties and as a co-chairing country of the OSCE Minsk Group.” 
This was yet another step forward in terms of reaching the agreement of a peace treaty 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia.98  
Later that same year, on 9th of August the two presidents met again in Russia and 
discussed current development of political situation both in the region and around the 
world as well. The major topic of discussion in this case as well was the topic of 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and what should have been done to move the development 
of the talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan.99  
On the 23rd of January, 2012 a joint meeting took place in the Home of Reception 
of the Grand Polyana Hotel in Sochi between the President of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, the President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev and 
the President of the Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan. During the meeting issues 
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related to the settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict have 
been discussed. The joint declaration was adopted on the outcomes of the meetings.100 
This meeting was in a way a summary of all the previous meetings and even a 
joint statement on the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement was issued. The statement read: 
The three Presidents pointed to a large amount of work to resolve 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict carried out since their meeting on 2 
November 2008, when the Moscow Declaration was adopted. The 
Presidents said that as a result of intense negotiations, they had reached 
progress in agreeing the basic principles of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
settlement.101 
The attempts of Dmitry Medvedev to resolve the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh 
have yielded certain results, even though the conflict itself was not resolved. In the 
direction of moving forward towards a peace treaty the advancements are noticeable at 
this point. Compared to the period before Medvedev the intensified talks had brought 
several agreements on minor issues but they have laid foundation for a bigger agreement 
which could lead to peaceful resolution of the conflict.  
The two Presidents also gave a high assessment to the mediation efforts of the 
Russian Federation and other OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries and expressed 
hope that Russia, France and the USA would continue to play an active role in the 
settlement until a lasting peace and stability are established in the region.102 
This was the final meeting of Medvedev as a president with Aliyev and the next 
visit the President of Azerbaijan paid to Russian Federation the President was already 
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Vladimir Putin, the predecessor and successor of Dmitry Medvedev. The mentioned 
visit was an unofficial one of the CIS Council of Heads of State.103 
After Medvedev’s term in office, the process of bilateral cooperation with 
Azerbaijan that he so actively supported during his presidency did not stop. His 
successor Vladimir Putin continued active cooperation and paid a visit to Azerbaijan on 
the 13th of August, 2013.104 During the talks, the topic of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
was discussed, but compared to what we used to see during Medvedev’s presidency, 
where the major topic of discussion was always the conflict, in this case the discourse 
slightly changed and the two presidents talked about a broad range of issues including 
energy, trade, defence, bilateral ties and regional issues. 
After the two presidents discussed the matters, they met with media on a press 
conference and President of Azerbaijan said: 
Today's visit provides fresh proof that our relations are dynamic 
and successful, and reflect our peoples' interests. We have discussed an 
extensive agenda, covering all issues of mutual interest, and we have 
mapped out plans for promoting our relations further.105 
The intensified meetings and mutual visits during the past decade truly represent 
the proof that relations between the two countries are developing and the results are far 
greater than they used to be in the decade before.  
In addition to this, steps taken forward in terms of military cooperation also speak 
of the political will of Moscow to be active supporter of Azerbaijan. It implies that 
Russia has its own interests which are mainly gaining influence on political processes in 
the region and influencing the westward shifted energy policy of Azerbaijan but the 
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balanced foreign policy that the country had during past two decades seem to have 
finally paid off. Azerbaijan is benefiting from such policy while giving in return to the 
both sides of major political players worldwide.  
The tensions grew in the political life of Azerbaijan lately after Russia annexed 
Crimea and it was seen as a threat to not only Azerbaijan but the whole Caucasus region. 
Russia has stated many times that it would never leave the region and the new 
developments increased threat.  
As Vladimir Putin completes Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Azerbaijan is 
feeling pressure as concerns increase that his attention will next shift southward. The 
Caspian Sea nation, the only westward route for central Asian oil and gas that bypasses 
Russia, is finding itself hemmed in by Putin’s regional ambitions. Russian troops are 
already stationed in neighbouring Georgia and Armenia and just four months ago, Putin 
said Russia will “never leave” the region.106 
With the increasing tensions in Nagorno-Karabakh as well, in year 2014, Russia 
again played a role of mediator in the cease-fire negotiations, but due to the recent 
developments Azerbaijan had a reason to be concerned.  
However, the last decade of Russian-Azerbaijani diplomatic relations have 
underlined that Azerbaijan is not alone in conflict with the neighbouring Armenia, who 
always had Russia as its supporter, but now Azerbaijan also has equal if not greater 
support from Russia. This has been reaffirmed many times in statements of the 
Presidents of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev.  
The work that Azerbaijani government has done during the past decade can be 
considered a huge diplomatic success, because they managed to shift the support of 
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Russia away from its adversary and focus it on themselves as well, if not more, then at 
least equally.  
 
3.3  Assessment of the Development of Russian - Azerbaijani 
Diplomatic Relations 
 
When we look back at the development of the Russian-Azerbaijani diplomatic 
relations it becomes apparent that there have been considerable improvements. As we 
saw in the previous chapters, after gaining independence, Azerbaijan did not start its 
diplomatic relations with Russia so well. The problem was mainly caused by Russia’s 
support towards Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
In the 1990s Russia was openly supporting Armenia concerning this issue and 
even though in speeches and public appearances leaders of Russia often stated that their 
major role was peacekeeping in the region, they were making arms  deals with Armenia 
that were hard to deny.  
However, for more than a decade after the 1990s, Azerbaijan’s government 
worked actively towards improving the diplomatic crisis it was experiencing towards 
Russia and managed to not only steer Russia’s interest away from Armenia, but got 
Russia interested in investing in Azerbaijani economy, making energy deals and even 
the arms deals. This was a result of many mutual visits of the heads of governments 
throughout the 2000s which continued in the beginning of the 2010s as well.  
The discussions with Russian officials over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
intensified especially after Medvedev took office in Russia. The results of the trilateral 
meetings including president of Armenia were giving little result in the beginning but by 
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the end of Medvedev’s presidential term, some progress in this direction was already 
visible.  
The major aspect of diplomatic relations with Russia has been the conflict of 
Nagorno-Karabakh and this is true especially about the presidential term of Dmitry 
Medvedev. What is more important in this regard, is that Azerbaijan managed to gain 
Russia’s open support on the topic which was almost inexistent before. This can 
undoubtedly be considered as a huge diplomatic success of Azerbaijani government.  
As we have mentioned above, Azerbaijan has always led a balanced foreign 
policy since its independence and if we try to assess the results of such a strategy, they 
can be said to be satisfactory. Russia is the major energy provider for Europe while 
Azerbaijan has a potential to be a competitor on this market as well as a route through 
which Asian energy can be provided to Europe. Russia sees this as a threat for losing its 
influence on Europe which it exercises through manipulating with its oil and natural gas. 
In order not to lose this influence, Russia needs to normalize relations with Azerbaijan 
and try to influence its foreign policy. Meanwhile Europe and western world try to 
increase their influence as well in order to gain energy independence from Russia and 
such interests of global players put Azerbaijan in a position where it has to choose best 
offers from all the global political actors.  
If the strategy of balanced foreign policy did not yield any noticeable results 
before, it sure showed its capabilities from the very beginning of the 21st century. The 
results are already reflected on Azerbaijan mainly in the major problem that the country 
is facing, which is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Even though Russia would probably 
never actively try to resolve the conflict in favour of any party, it is still important that 
Armenia is not the only side in the conflict that enjoys the support of such a big political 
actor as is Russia.  
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We talked about the results that Azerbaijan’s foreign policy brought and 
mentioned that it yielded most noticeable results during the presidential term of Dmitry 
Medvedev, but it is also important to determine the possible future development of the 
diplomatic relations of the two countries.  
It is obvious what the goals are for Russia, but it is difficult to predict how these 
relations may develop, because it depends on so many various factors. The only 
assumption we can make based on the information analysed and provided above, is that 
the diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Russia will improve as time passes, as 
long as there are no major changes in world politics. Russia is currently more interested 
in securing its energy dominance on the continent more than anything else. In this 
regard, Armenia has little to offer and this explains the shift in the support of countries 
in terms of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Such support is expected to continue until 
Russia reaches its goal of stopping or at least limiting the transfer of energy to Europe. It 
is another question what Azerbaijan will receive in return, and if it will be worth 
exchanging for the income that the country is receiving in energy deals with other 
countries. It is hard to predict because it depends on the decisions that officials will 
make when time comes.  
To summarize the topic of diplomatic relations, based on the information 
provided above, we can decisively say that the relations have improved during the past 
13 years and the improvement is most noticeable during the presidential term of Dmitry 
Medvedev. Based on the tendency of development of such relations and also based on 
the current political environment in the region and in the whole world as well, we can 
also make assumptions that diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Russia will 
develop further in the coming years.  
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4. Security Cooperation in Russian-Azerbaijani Relations 
 
4.1 Military and Technical Cooperation 
 
Similar to the development of diplomatic relations between Russia and 
Azerbaijan, the military and technical cooperation is also developing. We say it is 
similar to that, because it started from a scratch and reached the levels where 
Azerbaijan’s arch enemy Armenia is concerned over the military supply that the country 
is getting from Russia.  
Russia and Azerbaijan signed an intergovernmental agreement on military-
technical cooperation on February, 2003 in Baku. This date marked the beginning of a 
decade of ever developing cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan in the technical 
and military fields. 
The leaders of defence departments of the two countries made guest visits on a 
regular basis since after signing the above mentioned agreement. On 23–25 January 
2006 Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and Minister of Defence Sergei Ivanov visited 
Baku. In November 2007, Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov also visited 
Azerbaijan. On July 29, 2008, in Moscow, the Second Meeting of Russia-Azerbaijan 
Intergovernmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation took place.107 
Another important agreement in the field of military cooperation was signed on 
the 25th of January 2002. This was an agreement on the status, principles and conditions 
for use of the Qabala radar station. On June 8, 2007, at the G-8 summit in 
Heiligendamm, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a proposal to use the Qabala 
radar station as a part of the U.S.-developed missile defence system. The proposal was 
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supported by the Azerbaijani leadership, which considered it a contribution to stability 
and security in the region.108 
As time passed, the military cooperation between the two countries increased 
immensely and it culminated in year 2014.  
The scale of the whole deals was exposed in June, 2013 when it became known 
that Russia had begun delivering $1 billion worth of offensive weaponry, including 
about 100 tanks, to Azerbaijan in accordance with defence contracts signed in 2010-
2011. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev said in August of 2014 that the volume of 
military-technical cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan was measured at $4 
billion and it had a tendency to grow further.109 
It must be noted, that the above mentioned defence contracts were signed during 
the presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev. This illustrates that relations between Russia 
and Azerbaijan was most fruitful during Medvedev’s presidency and it is also worth 
mentioning that after Putin took office, this cooperation was not hindered and continued 
in its fast course. 
In addition to the 100 tanks bought, the Russians had previously supplied 
Azerbaijan with state-of-the-art S-300 air-defence systems worth hundreds of millions 
of dollars. They also agreed in 2010 to sell 24 Mi-35 helicopter gunships for a combined 
$360 million.110 
The military and technical cooperation cannot be expressed in numbers only. The 
arms are available to be bought from many different states, such as for example Israel 
who has advanced military technology to offer. But when Azerbaijan buys arms from 
Russia, who was a long-time supporter of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it 
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is also a political decision and a diplomatic success of Azerbaijan. By buying weapons 
from Russia, a statement is being made that Russia is willing to support Azerbaijan. It is 
true that Armenia has always been receiving weapons from Russia for free, while 
Azerbaijan has to pay billions for it, but the fact remains that compared to the 1990s 
when Baku enjoyed close to zero support from Moscow, making such huge arms deals 
with the country is a huge diplomatic success. And what is most important, Azerbaijan 
managed to achieve this goal in about a decade.  
Taking into consideration the political support Azerbaijan was receiving in the 
past decade from Russia, we can easily attribute the successful negotiations on arms 
deals with the right diplomacy of Baku.  
The political support is visible not only the amount of weapons that have been 
bought, but also by the statements of high ranking officials.  
During their meeting in Baku on the 7th of April, 2014 the chiefs of the Army 
General Staff of Russia and Azerbaijan, Colonel-General Valery Gerasimov and 
Colonel-General Najmaddin Sadigov discussed military-technical cooperation between 
the two countries. Gerasimov expressed hope that the military-technical cooperation 
between the two countries would continue and develop even further. In response to his 
counterpart’s remarks, Sadigov note that this was the first-ever visit to independent 
Azerbaijan by the chief of the Russian Army General Staff. He also reiterated that 
relations between the Armed Forces of Russia and Azerbaijan were developing well, 
calling Russia, major partner in military-technical co-operation, and expressing the wish 
to take this cooperation further.111 
It is this kind of political statements that speak louder than any weapon and 
Azerbaijan managed to gain such support from Russia which is mainly the result of the 
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balanced foreign policy Azerbaijan adopted and lived with until it started paying back. It 
is obvious from this standpoint that the balanced foreign policy was not proving to be 
successful in the beginning, but later developments in the international relations of 
Azerbaijan prove that the country is benefiting from such policy more than it is losing. 
 
4.2 Regulation of State Border between Russia and Azerbaijan in 
2010 
 
On the 3rd of September 2010 an agreement was signed between Russian 
Federation and Republic of Azerbaijan. The agreement defined border between the two 
countries. The agreement has been ratified by the parliaments of the countries.112  
It is mentioned in the supplementary documents of the agreement that the 
current border is a former administrative border between Dagestan SSR and 
Azerbaijan SSR. The ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia stated that there were no 
disputes about territories with Azerbaijan. The head of the committee in charge of 
CIS affairs, Aleksey Ostrovskji said that the signed document was serving to the 
interests of both countries.113  
The border is a total of 284 km long and its starting point is the place where 
the borders of Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan meet. There will be another trilateral 
agreement signed between these countries in order to officially establish this starting 
point. The border goes all the way to the Caspian Sea.114  
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Pic. 1 – The red line in the northernmost part of Azerbaijan defines the border with Russia. 
As a parliamentarian from Russia said, Azerbaijan was using 90% of water 
resources from the river Samur but after delimiting border, the agreement has been 
made that the water resources will be used 50% from each country.115 This was a 
long-standing issue between Russia and Azerbaijan and the agreement was never 
reached until this time. Azerbaijan was explaining the usage of most of the water 
from river Samur with the fact that they needed to provide drinking water to Baku. 
It was not stated publicly by Azerbaijan what was gained from this agreement 
considering that they formally agreed to give up the water resource they were using 
and apparently needed very much. It can only be assumed that Azerbaijan needed 
this agreement to secure its border and avoid any future possible disputes with 
Russia. This happened after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and in light of these events 
it is understandable that Azerbaijan had such position on the issue.  
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As a result of the above mentioned border delimitation two villages were 
transferred to Azerbaijan. These were: Kharakhoba and Uryanoba. These two 
villages were belonging to Azerbaijan but were transferred to the Dagestan ASSR 
during the Soviet Era in 1954. These territories were transferred to Dagestan 
temporarily in order to harvest and use it for other agricultural purposes and this 
agreement was then prolonged in 1984 for another 20 years, until 2004.116  
The several hundred residents of the above mentioned two villages, most of 
whom are Russian citizens and ethnic Lezgins, have two options to choose from, 
which are to apply for Azerbaijani citizenship in order to remain where they live, or 
resettle in Russia.117 However the Azerbaijani authorities offered the villagers to 
retain their Russian citizenship and register as temporary or permanent foreign 
residents of Azerbaijan, but in this case they would automatically lose the right to 
own property in Azerbaijan. Russian Federation also failed to relocate the families to 
Dagestan, into the territory of Russia.118 
It should be noted that the agreement was reached when Medvedev was in 
office which again underlines the fact that cooperation between the two countries 
was most active and fruitful during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev.  
Another dispute about water resources has also been going for the past 18 
years and the progress in resolution of this division is very slow. This concerns the 
usage of Caspian Sea water resources as well as natural resources of the sea. But in 
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this case there are five littoral countries involved in the dispute: Iran, Azerbaijan, 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.  
The discussion on the status of the Caspian Sea, to determine whether it will 
be legally defined as a sea or a lake is important for many reasons. If it is defined as a 
lake, then according to the international law, the bordering 5 countries would have 
to share the sea and equally divide profits from the resources gained from it, which is 
not in the interests of the oil producing countries. And if it is defined as a sea, the 
interests of Iran would be badly injured, because due to its short coastline, it would 
only receive 13 percent of the sea, which is also the largely unexplored and poor 
portion in terms of oil and gas deposits.119  
On the 4th Caspian Summit that was held in Astrakhan, the parties agreed on a 
wiser division of resources which concerns only the water resources of the Caspian 
Sea, but the seabed still remains undivided. The leaders of the countries expressed 
their belief that to agree on the division of the seabed will also be possible on the 
next Caspian Sea Summit to be held in Kazakhstan in 2015.120  
By the current agreement that was reached on the 4th Caspian Sea Summit, 5 
Caspian littoral countries share the water resources of the Caspian Sea the following 
way: Kazakhstan – 30.8%, Turkmenistan – 16.8%, Iran – 18.7%, Azerbaijan – 15.2 % 
and Russian Federation – 18.5%.121 As mentioned above, the division of the seabed of 
the Caspian Sea remains a hot topic of debate between these countries, but it is 
                                                          
119 "Tengrinews,"  in Caspian water delimitation agreement - a version of sea status (2014). 
120 "Tass - Russian News Agency,"  in Caspian Summit begins in Astrakhan (2014). 
121 "Natural Gas Europe,"  in Legal Status Of Caspian Sea (2014). 
62 
 
expected to reach a certain way of decision by the year 2015 when the next Caspian 
Sea Summit will be held in Kazakhstan. 
 
4.3 The Question of Nagorno-Karabakh in Russian-Azerbaijani 
Relations 
 
As it became apparent during our discussion above, major part of Azerbaijan’s 
foreign policy and its focus is directed towards resolving the conflict in Nagorno-
Karabakh. The discussion above shows that Azerbaijan managed to gain support from 
one of the main actors in this conflict which is Russian Federation. Most of this support 
was gained during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev.  
In order to continue our discussion, we need to look at the history of the conflict 
and its escalation, the war in the beginning of the 1990s and many clashes between the 
two countries during the years since then.  
The conflict started in 1988 and the main reason for this was attempts by 
Armenians in Moscow to have Nagorno-Karabakh transferred from the jurisdiction of 
the Azerbaijan SSR to Armenia. The armed conflict was very bloody and dramatic, and 
ended with the victory for the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, who received substantial, 
but informal support from Armenia and, in the final phase from Russia as well. Since 
1992, the conflict has been monitored by the so-called Minsk Group of the OSCE 
(Russia, USA, France), which is leading the negotiations between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia, representing Nagorno-Karabakh. The Armenians have declared readiness to 
withdraw from the so-called occupied territories (outside of Nagorno-Karabakh) except 
for the Lachin Corridor connecting the enclave with Armenia, on condition that they are 
granted guarantees of security for Nagorno-Karabakh. The Azerbaijanis treat Nagorno-
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Karabakh and the occupied areas in the same way, believing that all the territories seized 
by the Armenians are an integral part of their country.122 
 When the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began tens of thousands of Armenians 
staged mass demonstrations in Yerevan in support of a formal request by the Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to the Soviet leadership to designate the predominantly 
Armenian-populated region part of the then Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). 
The Soviet leadership rejected that demand and imposed direct rule in a bid to contain 
sporadic low-level fighting during which most of the region’s estimated 40,000 
Azerbaijani residents fled.123 
After the collapse of the USSR in late 1991 and the withdrawal of Russian army 
units from Azerbaijan, the combined Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh defence forces 
succeeded in cementing control over the breakaway region, which had formally declared 
its independence from the USSR in a referendum in December 1991. In 1992-1993, 
those forces occupied seven districts of Azerbaijan close to Nagorno-Karabakh, the 
Azerbaijani population of these regions also fled. In May 1994, a ceasefire was signed in 
Bishkek that ended full-scale hostilities, but which has not prevented sporadic 
exchanges of fire along the Line of Contact east of Nagorno-Karabakh that separates the 
Armenian and Azerbaijani forces deployed there. Mediation efforts launched in 1992 by 
the so-called “Minsk Group” of the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(renamed in 1994 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) have failed 
to yield a lasting political solution to the conflict.124 
 
                                                          
122 Wojciech Bartuzi, Katarzyna Pełczyńska-Nałęcz, and Krzysztof Strachota, "Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-
Karabakh: Unfrozen Conflicts between Russia and the West," (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, 2008). 
123 Elizabeth Fuller, "Azerbaijan’s Foreign Policy and the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict," in IAI WORKING PAPERS 13 | 
12 – April 2013 (Rome, Italy: Istituto Affari Internazionali 2013). 
124 Ibid. 
64 
 
4.3.1 Russia’s Interests in The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 
 
Among Azerbaijan’s five neighbours, Russia is arguably the most powerful and 
Azerbaijan has the closest ties with this country by virtue of their shared Soviet 
heritage.125 Russia has two main interests in the conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. This may seem contradictory at first sight. These contradictory interests are: 
keeping the conflict unresolved and maintaining stability in the region.126  
Keeping the conflict unresolved is in the interests of the Russian geopolitical 
goals in the “near abroad” (countries of the former Soviet Union, excluding the three 
Baltic states). Without the conflict Russia would have a much lower leverage over both 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Armenia is currently gaining a lot from having good relations 
with Russia. It was Armenia that was the initiator of the close ties between the two 
countries, but it does not seem to be Armenia’s preferred long-term state of affairs. In 
addition to this, in the near abroad, Russia cannot rely on the other post-Soviet countries 
to respect all treaties and agreements that they have signed. The example of 
Kazakhstan’s attempt to revise the lease agreement on the Baykonur rocket launch site 
that is scheduled to expire in 2050 can serve as a warning of what could happen in 
Armenia if it is no longer dependent on Russia for its security. Armenia has signed a 
treaty on the Russian military base, but it is not clear whether Armenia would not 
attempt to revise it and try to expel the military base from its territory. Removing the 
base would mean for Russia that they lose one of their key instruments of influence in 
the South Caucasus. Therefore, if the conflict got solved, it would mean that Russia’s 
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influence would most probably be significantly weakened over Armenia and in the 
whole region.127 
On the other hand, Russia is interested in maintaining stability in the South 
Caucasus, considering the fact that there is already tense situation in the North 
Caucasus, which is part of Russia. The August 2008 wars in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia were not as dangerous because these conflicts were of a short duration and were 
led by Russia. However, a potential new violent conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan would be presumably more violent and destructive (both sides would be 
likely to perceive the war as a “now or never” battle), which, unlike the Abkhaz and 
Ossetian conflicts, might destabilize the entire region. While in the Abkhazia and 
Ossetia conflicts, only Russia and Georgia were directly involved, a potential new 
violent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan will most probably include at least 
Turkey and Iran as important external parties, which might eventually lead to an 
increase in separatist activities in the North Caucasus. Therefore, in order to satisfy its 
interests in the region and in the world in general, Russia needs to keep the conflict 
unresolved but prevent any break-up of large-scale violent actions that could destabilize 
the situation in the South Caucasus and spill over to the Russian North Caucasus, as it 
did in the 1990s and early 2000s.128 
Russia is not in the position to allow Armenia to become de facto independent 
from Russia. In order for this to happen, Russia needs to make sure that the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict is not resolved. Considering this, Russia must continue to provide 
Armenia appropriate security guarantees in order for Armenia not to succumb to 
Azerbaijani threats of military action. If the conflict is resolved, Russia will most 
probably not support a peace deal unless it fits their interests in the region. A peace deal 
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that would be based on unfavourable conditions for Russia would undermine the 
influence of Russia in the entire region. To put it in other words, a peace deal has to be 
Russia’s deal.129 
When we look at the development of negotiation from Russia’s standpoint it 
becomes clear that above mentioned two statements are not contradictory at all. Russia 
uses the conflict to maintain control over the region. But in order to appear as a mediator 
for peace in the region Russia is organizing separate meetings between Armenian and 
Azerbaijani presidents outside of Minsk Group but these meetings lead to nowhere in 
terms of accomplishing peaceful settlement of the conflict. It is important to note that 
these meeting were most frequent during the presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev. He 
tried to achieve the settlement but if we look at it from the viewpoint that we discussed 
above, it seems that Medvedev was also trying to maintain the situation as it was. The 
frequent meetings were just an attempt to show that Russia has full control over this 
situation and nothing will ever be decided without its involvement.  
We have mentioned before that during last two decades Azerbaijan managed to 
gain Russia’s support over the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, but it has to be noted that it 
had nothing to do with the trilateral meetings. There were other factors that helped 
Azerbaijan gain more support from Russia and these were mostly economic and energy 
related.  
 
4.3.2 Negotiations on the Peace Process 
 
In 2008, Russia under the Medvedev’s administration took the initiative to lead 
the peace process in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This conflict is far from the top of 
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U.S. priorities, so Russia was given free hand by the Obama administration regarding 
this issue. Since 2008, Russia has organized quite a lot of meetings between the 
presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan in search of the ways to solve the conflict. After 
the return of Vladimir Putin to power, the Russian-led mediation efforts came to a 
halt.130 So to understand the importance of Medvedev’s administration’s involvement in 
this issue, it is enough to look at the lack of political will of Vladimir Putin regarding 
this issue. The policy of Russia remains the same but compared to Medvedev, Putin is 
not interested in leading negotiations on this subject.  
 There are at least two possible explanations for the sudden intensification of the 
mediation process and for the fact that Russia acted as a mediator on its own initiative. 
One explanation in the views of both Armenians and Azerbaijanis is that the above 
mentioned intensive Russian attempts to solve the conflict during Medvedev’s 
presidency were purely his personal initiative, however he had consent of Putin as well. 
Medvedev was viewed as more open-minded and rational than Putin. After Putin came 
back as president, Medvedev did not have the formal status any more so he did not 
continue being a mediator between Presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan.131  
Another explanation is that the Russian Federation seems to be creating an 
illusion of a genuine desire to solve the conflict. By this they are trying to create an 
image for themselves as a peace-keeper, because most of the armies they have deployed 
in South Caucasus are under this status.  
In the study edited by Hopmann and Zartman the true purpose of these initiatives 
by Medvedev is well summed up in a single Chapter: 
The reason for this is that Russia has never enjoyed much soft 
power in the world. This negative image became worse after the August 
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2008 war between Russia and Georgia. Since then, Russia has largely 
been viewed as a power that does not hesitate to use hard force to 
achieve its goals. As a result of the Abkhaz and Ossetian conflicts, 
Russia is viewed by many in the West as an aggressive state. Therefore, 
the attempts of Medvedev might have been essentially campaigns to 
improve this negative image of Russia in the world at no cost to its 
national interest. In this case, the task was facilitated by the fact that it 
was not Putin who was president at that time, but Medvedev. Since the 
Russian attempts to solve the conflict were likely to fail, it is unlikely that 
they would have been undertaken under Putin as president. Putin is 
considered to be reluctant to join any initiative that is doomed to failure 
from the very beginning. Therefore, the unilateral Russian mediation 
efforts can be now portrayed as a naïve personal initiative of 
Medvedev.132  
 
Ivan Benovic, the author of the above mentioned chapter uses an example to 
reinforce his opinion. In his article, he mentions that during the meeting with 
Azerbaijan’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Mr. Azimov, he said that Russian Foreign 
Minister Lavrov knew in advance that Azerbaijan would not accept his proposal 
presented in Sochi in 2011. Accepting this proposal would mean the same thing for 
Azerbaijan that it was for Georgia with regards to its separatist regions. In addition to 
this, President Aliyev has gotten no noteworthy criticism for rejecting the proposal. So, 
if all this is true, it would mean that Russia’s peace efforts were not genuine to begin 
with and they presented such a proposal that would be most definitely rejected.  
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This attitude of Russia is not surprising. It is in their interests to have the conflict 
unresolved, because as a result of ongoing conflict Armenia remains dependent on 
Russia for its security. As the South Caucasus is generally viewed as Russia’s backyard, 
too much violence in Nagorno-Karabakh may be regarded as either Russia’s inability to 
control the situation or its readiness to use human lives in its geopolitical calculations. 
But none of these interpretations would help Russia in to improve its negative 
international reputation.133  
 
4.3.3 Analysis and Implications of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict 
 
Considering the above mentioned facts it appears that Russia is the main actor in 
this conflict and it depends on this country if the settlement will ever be possible to 
reach. This is well understood both by Azerbaijan and Armenia and it is the reason why 
they compete for Russia’s support. So if it depend on Russia in whose favour the 
conflict will be resolved, then it is not surprising why the major parts of the foreign 
policy of these two countries is focused on this issue. Even if Medvedev’s attempts to 
resolve the conflict were not genuine as mentioned above, it can still be considered a 
success that Azerbaijan managed to shift the support from Armenia. Now Azerbaijan 
enjoys at least political support from Russia and it can buy weapons as well which is a 
huge success of Azerbaijani foreign policy.  
It is not surprising for anybody that Russia is a big political actor not only in this 
region but in the whole world and if there is no political will from Russia then the 
conflict will not be resolved. Many scholars agree that it is not in Russia’s interest for 
the conflict to be resolved, because they will lose the only ally they have in South 
Caucasus and will not be able to station their troops in the region. But if Azerbaijan 
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offers similar deal to Russia and agrees on establishing Russian military bases on Azeri 
soil with certain guarantees, there is a bigger chance that Russia will chose to resolve the 
conflict and resolve it in favour of Azerbaijan. The fact that Russia can gain more from 
cooperating with Azerbaijan is obvious, and increasing their political influence on this 
country would increase their political influence on Europe through energy 
manipulations, but on the other hand Azerbaijan seems to unwilling to give up its 
sovereignty for the 14% of the lost territories that were theirs to begin with.  
Similar question about the impossibility of the resolution of this conflict has been 
asked by Philip Gamaghelyan in his paper and his answer supports our assessment.  
The problem is not in the inability of the parties or mediators to 
find an appropriate solution. The problem is in the inadequacy of the 
process chosen to resolve the conflict. The secret of failure is in the 
persistent quest for a solution for a conflict in which any given 
comprehensive solution by itself is an obstacle for a lasting peace, 
because it will dissatisfy both immediate parties of the conflict. What the 
negotiators refuse to recognize is that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
has no quick solution or predetermined long-term solution. Pressing 
Armenian and Azerbaijani governments to sign an agreement until the 
underlying causes of the conflict are addressed and resolved is the most 
certain path toward failure and must be avoided.134 
There is no simple solution to this conflict because in any case at least one of the 
stakeholders will be dissatisfied, but as we said above Russia has the power and ability 
to resolve this conflict on its own initiative but in order for Azerbaijan to have this 
conflict resolved in its favour they will have to give up more than they would gain so 
this again is an obstacle in itself.  
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Russia is undoubtedly a very important factor in the South Caucasus. On the one 
hand, Russia has the capacity, both formal and informal, to influence the dynamics in 
the region. It has strong economic ties not only with Armenia, but also with Azerbaijan. 
Russia is a place for immigrants from both Armenia and Azerbaijan who cannot 
emigrate for work to the European Union or North America. The Russian language is 
still used as a lingua franca in the whole region.135 
However Ivan Benovic has somewhat different attitude on this subject. According 
to his claims the role of Russia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is quite exaggerated. 
The close political, economic and military ties between Russia and Armenia do not 
automatically mean that Armenia is completely dependent on Russia. The only way for 
Russia to substantially influence the conflict is through the military base and the security 
treaty, which sway the military balance between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis 
greatly in Armenia’s favour. Overall, it is in Russia’s interest to leave the conflict 
unresolved. However, Russia seems unlikely to have the needed leverage in the region 
to decide the status of the conflict on its own.136 
Basically Russia has this influence that it uses to play a political game and an age 
old strategy of Divide and Rule, but Azerbaijan’s efforts to gain the key player’s support 
on this matter is quite fruitful and while for quite a while Russia has been favouring 
Armenia in this conflict, now it is also openly supporting Azerbaijan which confirms 
that Azerbaijan is closer to resolving this conflict in its favour then the country has ever 
been before.  
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5. Economic Relations 
 
5.1 Trade Relations 
 
The economic and trade relations of Russia and Azerbaijan started with a free 
trade agreement between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan that 
was signed on the 30th of September, 1992. Since then there were many other 
agreements and protocols signed to regulate the trade relations between the two 
countries.137  
Azerbaijan is the fifth trade partner of Russia among the CIS countries and for 
Azerbaijan Russia is a major trade partner. Since 2006 trade representative of Russian 
Federation is working in Baku.  
The working mechanism for regulating decision-making process of Russian-
Azerbaijani trade relations on the state level is an intergovernmental commission that 
deals with economic and trade relations between the two countries.  
According to the State Customs Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, in 
2013 trade turnover between Russia and Azerbaijan reached 2583 million US dollars 
(increase 10.3%). Russian export to Azerbaijan was 1505.2 million dollars as compared 
to the same period of year 2012 and increased by 9%. Export of goods from Azerbaijan 
to Russia was worth 1077.8 million dollars and compared to the same period of the 
previous year, it increased by 12.3%.138 This example illustrates that there was growth in 
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trade turnover between Russia and Azerbaijan in the year 2013 as compared to year 
2012. Such growth is noticeable in previous years as well.  
The structure of trade relations between the two countries is diversified. Almost 
90 percent of Russian exports is downstream products. The main product of Russian 
export is machinery, equipment and vehicles, food, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, 
metal, wood, pulp and paper products, chemical products and electricity. The structure 
of Azerbaijani exports to Russia in the past year was dominated by mineral products 
(53.3% of total exports). The share of foodstuffs and agricultural raw materials 
amounted to approximately 19.1%.139 
There are several major Russian companies that operate in Azerbaijan. For 
example, in the retail sale of petroleum products company "Lukoil-Azerbaijan" is 
operating, which has the network of petrol stations and fuel storage throughout the 
whole country. It also provides trade, transportation, insurance, telecommunication 
services, a system of cashless payments using plastic cards and carries out charitable 
activities. In addition to this, in the field of international gas and condensate production 
in Azerbaijan a group of "Lukoil Overseas" is active, which represents the interests of 
the Russian oil company "Lukoil". The country "Lukoil Overseas" is party to the 
Agreement on the Exploration, Development and Production Sharing offshore gas 
condensate field "Shah Deniz" with an interest in the project to 10%.140 The mentioned 
deal by which Lukoil owns 10 percent of “Shah Deniz” oil field is a part of the “deal of 
the century” contract by which major part of the oil field share was bought by European 
and Western oil companies.  
As a General overview we can provide the bulk number of Russian companies in 
Azerbaijan. There are more than 500 companies operating on the Azerbaijani market, 
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including 200 with 100% Russian capital and more than 300 - in the format of a joint 
venture.141 
As regards the assessment by the officials of these two countries they are positive. 
Presidents of Russia and Azerbaijan are satisfied with the development of bilateral 
relations, in particular, the record pace of trade and diversification of relations between 
the two countries. In his remarks, as cited on the website news.az on the 14th of August, 
2013, Vladimir Putin said the following: “Indeed, the relations between our countries 
are developing very successfully: in spite of the difficult overall situation in the world 
economy, our growth in turnover for last year was 47%, it is one of the records for us”. 
The head of Russian state added: "Russia remains one of the leaders in the trade and 
economic relations with Azerbaijan. It takes the second place, the trade turnover is 
growing, and what is especially nice is the significant structure of trade on both 
Azerbaijan’s and Russian side”.142 The increase is noticeable not only in the year 
mentioned year but in the previous years as well. 
During Dmitry Medvedev’s term in office, from the very first year, in 2008 the 
trade turnover between the two countries increased annually by 39.3% and amounted to 
US$2.403 billion, exports grew by 42.6% up to $1.9911 billion, imports increased by 
25.4% up to $411.4 million.143 
United Nation’s website, UNcomtrade offers statistics on the amount of trade 
between different countries, so we have summarized below the amount of trade between 
Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
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Pic. 2 – Trade amount and its development over a decade between Russia and Azerbaijan.144  
As it becomes clear from the graph presented above, trade turnover between the 
two countries has increased considerably over the past decade. Quite big increase both 
in imports and exports is noticeable from year 2006. But the most noticeable growth is 
in the years 2008-2012 which coincides with the presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev. 
Since 2012 there has been a small drop, but it is not directly attributable to anything and 
considering the level of cooperation between the governments of Russia and Azerbaijan, 
next year statistics might show increase in trade turnover.  
It is difficult to directly attribute the increase in trade between Russia and 
Azerbaijan to the presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev, because it will be hard to 
prove, but we should not forget that it was during Medvedev’s presidency that 
Azerbaijan’s relations with Russia began to improve and cooperation between the two 
countries increased. The support of the Russian government shown during this period 
and the frequent high-level meetings between the government officials surely influenced 
the economy and the trust of the companies operating in these countries increased. They 
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began to see the relations between the two countries as steady and as a result the trade 
relations improved.  
We should also take into consideration, that the energy contracts that have been 
signed are important as well. Most of the Azerbaijani export is natural gas to Russia and 
even though this is not all that Azerbaijan exports to Russia, it is still a great part of its 
exports.  
The trade balance remains stable throughout the years and there are no 
unexpected fluctuations, which speaks of the stable economic environment and good 
foreign policy of Azerbaijan.  
To sum up, the drastic increase in trade turnover in years 2008-2012 indicates that 
the efforts Dmitry Medvedev made to stabilize relation with Azerbaijan had their effect 
and it was best shown in the increased import and export of goods between the two 
countries. This positive trend continued throughout the four year presidential term of 
Dmitry Medvedev and it continued in the year 2013 as well, with a slight drop, but is 
expected to increase in the following years, or show very little drop in trade turnover 
between Russia and Azerbaijan.  
 
5.2  Energy Sector 
 
The development of energy sector in independent Azerbaijan started with the 
“Contract of the Century”. It started the revival of oil industry in Azerbaijan, which is 
95% of the country’s total exports and it clearly illustrates the basic outline of 
Azerbaijan’s foreign policy. Its foreign policy is balanced and so is the energy policy. 
There are different European, Western and Russian companies involved in the 
production of oil and natural gas in Azerbaijan.  
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The contract of the century was signed on the 20th of September 1994 and 
companies such as BP, Exxon, Amoco, Penzoil, Statoil, Unocal, Ramco and several 
other European companies as well as Russian Lukoil bought shares in the industry. The 
first production sharing agreement (PSA) was the contract for the development of the 
Azeri-Chiraq-Guneshli (ACG) oil field on the Azerbaijani section of the Caspian Sea 
which was signed by the Azerbaijani government and Western energy firms. This 
contract paved the way for more PSAs in the future. It was a dangerous precedent from 
the perspective of Russian and Iranian policy-makers and politicians, who were 
opposing any contract of any kind that extended Western influence in the Caspian 
region.145 
This agreement was not favoured in Russia from the very beginning and the 
diplomats in Kremlin tried using all the tools at their disposal to try and prevent the 
Contract of the Century to be implemented.  
The Russian foreign ministry immediately denounced the agreement by saying 
that the unresolved legal status of the Caspian Sea made it impossible for any of the 
littoral states to sign any legal contracts with Western companies and start exploration. 
This was followed by threats of sanctions against Azerbaijan. The Russian officials also 
argued that the existing oil and gas fields in the Caspian were discovered during Soviet 
times and should be considered as resources of the Russian Federation.146 
Since the 1990s the Northern Pipeline that ran through the territory of Chechnya 
was going until Novorossiysk was the only export route for Azerbaijani oil. The country 
then did not have means to export its oil products to Europe. The Chechen conflict in the 
middle of 1990s put a stop to its use, but it again became active in 1997. The Chechen 
government wanted to sign an agreement between Russia, Chechnya and Azerbaijan that 
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78 
 
would govern the usage of this pipeline, but Azerbaijani politicians feared that going 
with such an agreement would encourage secessionist movement in Nagorno-Karabakh 
and they did not agree to it. However, in order to avoid complications and have the 
pipeline working, Vladimir Putin ordered to have another pipeline constructed through 
the territory of Dagestan which completely avoided passing the territory of Chechnya.147  
If in the 1990s Russia’s energy policy in the region was to attempt its 
monopolization, in the 2000s this strategy changed. Russian officials began to see the 
development of energy sector in the South Caucasus and especially in Azerbaijan as 
mutually beneficial for all stakeholders.  
In order to demonstrate their willingness have the energy sector developed in the 
South Caucasus the deputy prime minister of Russia, Boris Nemtsov, along with the 
presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine, took part in the inauguration of the 
pipeline.148 
With the discovery of Shah Deniz Gas Field in offshore Azerbaijan in the Caspian 
Sea and with the start of Production in 2006 Azerbaijan quickly transformed from 
importer of gas into a major exporter of this commodity.  
The most noteworthy agreement in this field and for our research purposes is the 
agreement that was signed on the 9th of June, 2009 between Russia and Azerbaijan on 
exporting gas to Russia for the same price that Europe was planning to pay. When we 
observe this phenomenon, it becomes apparent that with this agreement economic ties of 
the two countries grew, especially in energy sector, but on the other hand it is hard to 
claim that Russia was in need of importing gas for this price. It is more likely that with 
this deal Russia secured its influence over Europe by putting the projects in jeopardy 
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that were supposed to carry Azerbaijani energy to the European continent. Shahin 
Abbasov explained in his article on Eurasianet.org on September 3, 2010 this way.  
 Such an arrangement raises questions about the future of some 
long-planned energy projects, namely the NABUCCO pipeline. 
Azerbaijan is seen as a primary supplier of the NABUCCO route. But 
this latest Russian deal stands to foster uncertainty over Azerbaijan’s 
desire to supply a sufficient volume of gas to make NABUCCO 
financially tenable. Moscow has long opposed NABUCCO, the 
completion of which would create a Caspian Basin export route that 
avoids Russian territory.149 
In the same article, the author used Russian president Dmitry Medvedev’s speech 
on Russian-Azerbaijani relations. He says: “Russia and Azerbaijan are serious players, 
gas suppliers, so we should not create obstacles to each other”.150 If we try to interpret 
this, it means that Medvedev clearly stated Russia’s goals to hinder the development of 
NABUCCO project or any other prospective project that may come in the future.  
From what we discussed above, we can conclude that for a brief moment in the 
near past, Russia tried to be liberal in terms of development of energy sector in South 
Caucasus, but it appears that these were the steps taken to appear well in the public eye 
of the whole world. The steps taken by Medvedev’s administration in yet another 
attempt to monopolize Azerbaijani energy, proves that their policy is still aggressive and 
they still want to use energy as a leverage in maintaining political influence over 
Europe. It should be noted here as well that this time the attempt of monopolization was 
not based on threats and creation of disturbances in the life of Azerbaijan, but it was a 
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purely economic deal that allowed Russia to buy most of the product that Azerbaijan 
produces from Shah Deniz gas field.  
However, if we look at this deal in terms of economic benefit for Azerbaijan, it 
was a successful agreement, yet another one that was signed during the presidential term 
of Dmitry Medvedev. Azerbaijan sees Russia as reliable partner, but does not chose to 
retain relations with Russia only. On the other hand, cooperation in many other fields 
creates and atmosphere in which Azerbaijani economy will thrive if the governments 
retain good neighbourly relations.  
There have been several important agreements signed in the last two decades 
between Russia and Azerbaijan in the energy sector, but the crowning one was the 
agreement signed by Dmitry Medvedev and Ilham Aliyev that brought the economies of 
the two nations closer to each other with yet another deal in energy sector.  
 
5.3 Tourism Sector 
 
The conflict that arose in Nagorno-Karabakh had its negative results on the whole 
economy of Azerbaijan and tourism sector was not an exception either. The arrival of 
tourists in Azerbaijan was very low in the 1990s due to the above mentioned conflict 
and it affected the development of tourism in later years as well because the image of 
country was worsened throughout the whole world.  
However tourism started to develop and the number of foreign tourists arriving in 
Azerbaijan started to increase gradually in the 2000s.  
In Azerbaijan the most important segment of the tourism potential is the sunny 
coast of the Caspian Sea. It has various natural landscapes and sandy beaches. 
Particularly important improvement has been made in Absheron which has highly 
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effective and competitive tourism complex along the sea coast, which will by all means 
meet all the requirements of foreign tourists as well as the citizens of Azerbaijan. A 
great number of mud-cures and mineral springs create additional opportunities for 
organization of recreational and treatment tours in the country.151 The regions of 
Azerbaijan have great potential of developing tourist infrastructure, but most of the 
regions are still underdeveloped. Till today, Baku remains the main tourist destination 
and the capital city offers everything tourists are looking for including entertainment, 
recreation and sightseeing.  
It is hard to claim what benefits tourists bring to Azerbaijani economy. According 
to the approximate calculations, one tourist spends $600-700 during his/her stay. 
According to the calculations of ‘World Trade Organization’, tourists who travel to the 
country spend approximately $1000 in the world. These calculations include not just 
money spent in the hotels but also money spent on souvenirs, industrial products, food, 
transportation, entertainment, etc. Unfortunately, there is no such kind of calculation in 
Azerbaijan. According to the official statistics, the total amount of income from tourism 
equalled approximately $177 million in 2007, and $96.5 million in the second half of 
2008.152 
The focus of this paper is relations between Russian Federation and the Republic 
of Azerbaijan. So we are more interested in the number of tourists arriving from Russia 
as well as the number of tourists travelling to Russia from Azerbaijan. Below we will 
present statistical information that is available and try to analyse its growth and see how 
it changed in the course of history and with the changes of government and presidents in 
Russia. The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan offers data from 
2007 to 2013 and this data is analysed below.  
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Pic. 3 – Total Number of Tourists from Azerbaijan to Russia and vice-versa.153  
The number of foreign tourists who visited Azerbaijan in 2002 was 428,397; in 
2003 - 629,753; in 2004 – 785,910 and in 2005 – 865,255.154 According to this data, 
tourism was growing before 2007 as well. Unfortunately the data about how many of 
these foreign tourists were Russian is not available. For example, in 2007 153,100 
tourists out of a total of 1,235,600 arrived to Azerbaijan from Russia. This numbers is 
the highest as compared to tourists from other countries in the same year. So we can 
assume that if in this case 12.4% of all arriving tourists were from Russia, in the 
previous years the percentage could be close to 12.  
If our assumption is correct, the graph below will show approximate amount of 
tourists arriving from Russia to Azerbaijan. 
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Pic. 4 - Assumed Number of Russian Tourists in Azerbaijan155 
 We have taken 12% of each total number of tourists that arrived to Azerbaijan and if 
our calculations are correct, the graph presented above shows increase in the number of 
tourists arriving from Russia to Azerbaijan. We have to allow the possibility of error here, 
because the numbers do not come close to what we see from 2007, but we have mentioned 
above that tourism started to grow in Azerbaijan from 2000s and this might be accurate, 
considering that tourism started developing slowly.  
 The data provided by the State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan 
allows us to analyse it by the number of tourists that visited Russia from Azerbaijan and 
vice-versa.  
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Pic. 5 - Number of Tourists from Azerbaijan to Russia.156 
As we can see from the graph above, the number of tourists visiting Russia from 
Azerbaijan drastically increased in the period of 2008-2012. This period is the most 
important for our thesis, because it is the period when Dmitry Medvedev was president. 
By the end of Medvedev’s presidential term, the number of tourists visiting Russia from 
Azerbaijan tripled compared to the data of year 2007. This increase can be assimilated to 
the intensified relations between the two countries in this period as well as frequent visits 
of high-level officials. Since the relations between the two countries was the most active in 
this period the interest in the population increased and the number of tourists increased as 
well. We cannot relate this increase to any kind of visa procedures, or simplification of 
visa procedures because citizens of Azerbaijan do not need visa to travel to Russia. 
According to the agreement on visa-free arrival and departure of the citizens of Russian 
Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan that was signed between the Government of 
Russian Federation and the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Moscow, on the 
3rd of July, 1997, the citizens of both countries have since been able to travel between 
these two countries visa-free. So the increase in the number of tourists can be explained 
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with warmer diplomatic relations between the two countries that improved mostly in the 
period of 2008-12.  
The picture is a little different when we talk about the Russian tourists arriving to 
Azerbaijan. The trend of increase and decrease in numbers is almost the same but the 
number of tourists are much less.  
 
Pic. 6 - Number of Tourists from Azerbaijan to Russia.157 
As we can see, the trend that was visible in previous case is almost the same here. In 
the period of 2008-12 the increase in the number of tourists visiting Russia from 
Azerbaijan is growing rapidly, and it reaches the highest peak by the end of Medvedev’s 
presidential term. After that we see a sudden decrease in the number. It is hard to directly 
assimilate the number of tourists visiting a country to the president of that country, but we 
cannot deny that the relations between the two countries were warmer in that period and 
the number of tourists was higher too.  
To put the difference in perspective, we can compare the two directions of the flow 
of tourists and visualize the difference: 
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Pic. 7 - Number of Tourists from Russia to Azerbaijan and Vice-versa.158 
By comparison the number of tourists travelling from Russia to Azerbaijan is less, 
than the number of tourists travelling from Azerbaijan to Russia, but as we can see in the 
graph above, the trend of development of tourist movement, as well as increase and 
decrease is quite similar.  
In general we can conclude that movement of tourists between these two countries 
increased most noticeably during the period of 2008-12 which coincides with the period of 
our focus – the presidential term of Dmitry Medvedev in Russia. Someone might argue 
that president of any country has nothing to do with the increase of the number of tourists 
but the trend illustrated in all the graphs above shows that the increase was most drastic in 
this period and while the president himself might have nothing to do with it personally, the 
warm relations between countries that was most developed in this period surely affects the 
number of tourists visiting the countries.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have analysed different aspects of Russian-Azerbaijani relations 
and discussed the state of development of relations between them in the period of Dmitry 
Medvedev’s presidential term and afterwards.  
The historical and statistical data provided and its analysis allows us to conclude 
that the relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Azerbaijan have 
developed considerably during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidential term. The cooperation has 
increased in many fields and the visits, mostly concerning talks on Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, were highest in numbers. The period after is Dmitry Medvedev’s term in office 
that this paper covered is a little over one year and it is hard to talk about the trends of 
development of relations after his presidency, but the relations between the two countries 
remain warm and cooperation continues.  
As is shown in our discussion above the diplomatic relations improved between the 
two countries and it brought new levels of cooperation as well. The active diplomatic 
cooperation between the two governments during the presidential term of Medvedev have 
brought a lot of benefits for Azerbaijan especially regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict and in this period Russia turned into a supporter of Azerbaijan in this regard, 
which is an improvement compared to previous state when Russia was a direct supporter 
of the other side of this conflict – Armenia.  
The above mentioned improvement in diplomatic relations brought military 
cooperation of the two countries to a new level and it increased considerably as compared 
to the previously existing cooperation which was minimal. The fact that Azerbaijan has 
bought 4 billion US dollars’ worth of weapons from Russia says a lot about the support 
Baku is getting from Moscow regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
88 
 
However, the improvement in the relations of Azerbaijan and Russia is most visible 
in the economic sector. This is the field which can be measured by numbers and not only 
statements that politicians make and our discussion above showed that there are noticeable 
improvements in the economic relations of the two countries. The relations in trade, 
energy and tourism have drastically improved in the period of Medvedev’s presidency and 
the numbers show slight decrease in 2013 when Medvedev was no longer president, but 
the current heads of governments of the two countries are trying to maintain the existing 
warm relations and the cooperation is expected to improve or at least remain on the level 
that was reached during Medvedev’s presidency.  
The results we have received from our discussion and observation implies that 
heads of governments have major influence on the development of relations between 
countries and in this case Azerbaijan was successful in utilizing the support that Russian 
government under Dmitry Medvedev offered. It is a success for Azerbaijan, particularly 
because it is hard to build good neighbourly relations but once the goal is reached, it is 
much easier to maintain it. 
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